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RETHINKING ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA IN
THE WAKE OF JONES V. LOS ANGELES:
AVOIDING THE "DEMISE OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW" BY ATTENDING TO
"PUNISHMENT"
MARTIN R. GARDNER*
For nearly forty years, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Robinson v. California has been understood to hold merely that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids
punishing status conditions and thus requires a criminal act as a
precondition for imposition of the criminal sanction. However, a recent
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Jones v. Los Angeles, would expand
the reach of Robinsonfrom simply embodying the actus reus requirement to
also forbid as a mens rea matter the punishment of acts deemed inherent in
status conditions. Professor Gardner evaluates Jones and argues that
extending Robinson to mens rea issues is unwise and poses a radical threat
to traditional criminal law doctrine that perhaps even threatens the
continued existence of the criminal law itself Professor Gardner argues
that the Jones expansion of Robinson is a consequence of the Supreme
Court's misapplication of the Eighth Amendment in Robinson. Because the
sanction at issue in Robinson was not in fact "punishment" but was instead
an inherently unconstitutional sanction characterized by Professor Gardner
as "malishment, "he argues that Robinson should never have been decided
as a cruel punishment case but instead as one manifesting arbitrary state
power unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. To reverse the
movement towards constitutionalization of mens rea, Professor Gardner
urges the Supreme Court to rethink Robinson as a due process case thus
cabining the decision to reflect only that a criminal act is a constitutional
prerequisite for governmental imposition ofpunishment.
* Steinhart Foundation Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. The
author expresses gratitude to Krista Carlson for her outstanding research assistance; to his
colleague, Bob Schopp, for his helpful suggestions; and to the Ross McCollum Faculty
Research Fund at the University of Nebraska College of Law for its financial support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1962 opinion Robinson v. California,' the United States Supreme
Court held that a jail sentence of ninety days to one year for the status of
being "addicted to the use of narcotics" constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Robinson broke new constitutional ground by its
unprecedented employment of the Eighth Amendment to strike down a
sanction as cruel on grounds other than its mode or its proportion.2
Robinson precipitated immediate controversy.3 For Herbert Packer,
perhaps the leading criminal law commentator of the day, Robinson raised
more questions than it answered and planted the seeds for a radical
remaking of the criminal law, possibly even sounding its death knell. In
Packer's words, "[I]f [Robinson's] premise, that the legislature may not
make it a 'crime' to be 'sick' is to be taken literally, the demise of the
criminal law may be at hand." 4
' 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2 One commentator described Robinson as follows:
Thus for the first time the Court held that the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual
punishments not only has to do with the type and severity of punishment for what is concededly
a crime but also prohibits any punishment for what is not a crime but is instead the status of
having an illness.
George F. Bason, Jr., Chronic Alcoholism and Public Drunkenness-Quo Vadis Post
Powell, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 48, 50 (1970). Another commentator described the case this way:
Robinson v. California may have established in the eighth amendment a basis for invalidating
legislation that is thought inappropriately to invoke the criminal sanction, despite an entire lack
of precedent for the idea that a punishment may be deemed cruel not because of its mode or even
its proportion but because the conduct for which it is imposed should not be subjected to the
criminal sanction.
Herbert L. Packer, Comment, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071
(1964). But see James S. Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of
Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REv. 996, 1010 (1964), for
the view that Robinson "involves the clearest and easiest application of the [proportionality]
principle: the offense which is charged is such that any punishment of fine or imprisonment
would be excessive in relation to it." See also infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder & Robert Wade Merson, Robinson v. California: An
Abbreviated Study, 3 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 203, 204 (1965) (arguing that the Court decided
Robinson on Eighth Amendment grounds because it "wanted almost completely to overhaul
State substantive criminal law"); Hugh R. Manes, Robinson v. California, A Farewell to
Rationalism?, 22 LAW IN TRANSITION 238, 244 (1963) (suggesting that Robinson would
"admonish the states to re-examine their criminal laws and procedures"); John B. Neibel,
Implications of Robinson v. California, I Hous. L. REv. 1, 11 (1963) (arguing that Robinson
would change the way society treats drug addiction and alcoholism, steering the trend from
imprisonment to proper diagnosis and medical treatment).
4 Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 107, 147-48,
n.144 (1962); see also Broeder & Merson, supra note 3, at 207 (outlining the momentous
implications of Robinson).
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Such perceptions of the impact of Robinson were only strengthened by
the Court's subsequent decision in Powell v. Texas5 rendered several years
after Robinson. Powell addressed the question of whether it constituted
cruel and unusual punishment to punish an alcoholic for public
drunkenness. The defendant argued that alcoholism is a disease and
appearances by alcoholics in public are but symptoms of the disease, so to
punish acts inherent in the disease is to punish the disease itself. While the
Powell Court did not find a constitutional violation under the facts of the
case, the inconclusive nature of the opinion6 nevertheless left open the
possibility that acts deemed uncontrollable as manifestations of diseases or
other status conditions may in future cases fall within Robinson's ban.
After Powell, the Supreme Court offered no more guidance on the
meaning of Robinson. In the ensuing years, the lower courts generally
sustained punishments attacked under Robinson so long as an act rather
than a mere status was being punished.7 Robinson thus had little impact and
certainly did not result in radical doctrinal change. A recent lower court
development suggests, however, that Robinson's period of dormancy may
be ending. In its 2006 opinion Jones v. Los Angeles,8 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals relied on Robinson and Powell in finding that it was cruel
and unusual punishment to impose criminal sanctions upon homeless
persons who violated a city ordinance prohibiting, among other things,
sitting, lying, or sleeping on public sidewalks. The Jones court found that
the acts of sitting or sleeping on the sidewalk were inherent in the status of
homelessness, and therefore to punish such acts was to punish the status
contrary to Robinson.
The Jones approach represents a dramatic change of direction in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. At a minimum, the case introduces the
constitutionalization of the traditional mens rea principle. If followed to its
logical conclusion, Jones portends radical doctrinal change, potentially
signaling the very "demise of the criminal law" foretold by Packer.
' 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 35-46, 51-54.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 64-71.
' 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 04-55324, 2007 WL 3010591, at *1 (9th
Cir. Oct. 15, 2007). As this article was in the process of publication, the Jones opinion was
vacated as the result of an agreed-upon settlement between the parties. The merits of the
court's approach to the issues presented remain available for other courts to consult in
subsequent cases raising similar issues. For favorable comment on Jones, see Joseph
William Singer, After the Flood: Equality and Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 LoY. L.
REv. 243, 323 (2006). For the basis of the settlement agreement, see Steve Hymon & David
Zahniser, Deal on Sidewalk Camping Reached, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at B 1; and Skid
Row Sanity, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A22.
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This Article explores the ramifications of the Jones case and argues
that, while the decision may in part be consistent with Robinson and
Powell, it should nevertheless be rejected. I argue that the mischief created
by Jones is the consequence of a fundamental mistake made by the
Robinson Court in grounding that case in the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause rather than in more appropriate substantive due process
doctrine. Specifically, I argue that the problem with the sanction applied to
drug addiction in Robinson was not that it was cruel punishment under the
Eighth Amendment but that its application was blatantly irrational as a due
process matter. The due process analysis of Robinson I recommend would
resolve the problem posed by criminalizing status conditions by articulating
a sound but narrow constitutional principle, thus avoiding the radical
implications of Jones.
In Part II, I discuss Robinson and Powell and their progeny up to
Jones. In Part III, I critique Jones and argue that a failure to attend to the
concept of punishment led the court erroneously to grant standing to
unconvicted homeless litigants to raise Eighth Amendment claims. I then
explore the unwelcome implications of the Jones case and trace its
existence as a product of Robinson's Eighth Amendment underpinnings. In
Part IV, I examine the concept of punishment in light of Supreme Court
definitions as well as relevant philosophical literature. This discussion
illustrates that the sanction at issue in Robinson was not in fact
"punishment." To make this point, I appeal to John Rawls's heuristic
distinction between "telishment" (his term) and "punishment" in coining
my own term, "malishment," to describe the sanction in Robinson. Because
"punishment" was not at stake in Robinson, the Court inappropriately
utilized the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in reaching its decision,
resulting in a much broader decision in Robinson than was necessary to
decide the issue raised in the case. I then analyze Robinson in Part V under
what I believe to be the proper constitutional theory, the Due Process
Clause, and demonstrate the unconstitutionality of employing the
malishment sanction.
All of this is to urge the Supreme Court, at its earliest opportunity, to
revisit Robinson and rethink it under a substantive due process footing.
Such a rethinking will preserve the results in Robinson and Powell but
avoid the Jones approach with its deleterious implications. Proper analysis
of the issue raised by Robinson will, in the end, result in the modest, but
essential, constitutional conclusion that without a criminal act there can be
no punishment.
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II. ROBINSON AND ITS OFFSPRING
Prior to Robinson, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment 9 had played a relatively unimportant role in American
constitutional jurisprudence. In the nineteenth century, the clause was
seldom invoked in the courts, and then only as a vehicle to address the
constitutionality of questionable methods of punishment, but not as a means
of measuring the proportionality of punishment to crime.10 The clause was
so insignificant that some nineteenth-century courts and commentators
actually believed it to be obsolete.11
Early in the twentieth century the Supreme Court expanded the scope
of the clause to invalidate acceptable modes of punishment deemed
excessive in relation to the offense being punished.12  Yet even then, the
clause was seldom used to invalidate harsh sentences. 13 Given this
background, the Robinson Court's sudden application of the clause in a case
questioning neither the method nor the proportionality of punishment14 wasdeemed a "sweeping"' 15 and "novel" development.1 6
A. ROBINSON V CALIFORNIA
The Robinson Court considered the constitutionality of a California
statute making it a misdemeanor, inter alia, to "be addicted to the use of
narcotics." Persons violating the statute were subjected to a confinement
of ninety days to one year in the county jail.
18
9 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10 See generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted":
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969); Note, The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 636-39
(1966).
11 Granucci, supra note 10, at 842; Note, supra note 10, at 647.
12 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see Granucci, supra note 10, at 843;
Note, supra note 10, at 633-40.
13 Note, supra note 10, at 635.
14 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 81 (2d ed. 1995); see supra note
2. Robinson was "the first case in which the Eighth [Amendment's] ban against cruel and
unusual punishment has been invoked to overturn the substantive provisions of a statute, as
distinguished from the penalties inflicted by it." Manes, supra note 3, at 238.
15 Michael R. Asimow, Constitutional Law: Punishment for Narcotic Addiction Held
Cruel and Unusual-Robinson v. California (U.S. 1962), 51 CAL. L. REv. 219-20 n.7 (1963)
(noting that Robinson "sweepingly redefined the clause").
16 Note, supra note 10, at 645.
17 The statute provided in full:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics,
excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the State to
prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the defense to show that it comes
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Although the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause previously had
never been applied to the states, 19 a five-member majority of the Court
utilized the clause to invalidate the statute's application to drug addicts.
The Court noted that the statute made the mere "status" of narcotic
addiction a criminal offense whether or not the offender had ever used or
possessed narcotics within the State or had engaged in any antisocial
behavior there. Citing but one Eighth Amendment case as authority 20 and
offering no further analysis or explanation, the Court said:
A State might determine that the general health and welfare require that the
victims.., of human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving
quarantine, confinement, or sequestration ....
[N]arcotic addiction is an illness ... which may be contracted innocently or
involuntarily. We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a
criminal ... inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment .... To be sure, imprisonment
for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual.
But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold.
2 1
In dicta, the Court further allowed that the States retained broad power to
impose criminal sanctions against the "unauthorized manufacture,
prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics" within its borders.22
While the Robinson majority merely concluded without analysis that
the Eighth Amendment invalidated the California statute,23 Justice Douglas,
within the exception. Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one
year in the county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a
period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require as a
condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no event
does the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation
of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (Deering 1952 & Supp. 1959), as quoted in Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
1s Id.
19 Manes, supra note 3, at 238; Note, supra note 10, at 645.
20 The case was Louisiana ex rel. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), which held that
carrying out the execution of a convicted murderer, after a first execution attempt had failed
because of mechanical failure in the electric chair, did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. The Robinson Court merely cited Resweber without any discussion. See 370
U.S. at 666.
21 370 U.S. at 666-67.
22 Id. at 664. The Court also cited Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921), which
opined that the "use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs" could also be regulated by the
States. 370 U.S. at 664 (emphasis added).
23 The only "analysis" the Court offered was its observation that "in light of
contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of... a disease
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in a concurring opinion, appealed to the Court's proportionality cases as
grounds for the Robinson Court's decision. For Douglas, "the principle that
would deny power to exact capital punishment for a petty crime would also
deny power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment for being sick.,
24
Douglas further elaborated:
Cruel and unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting
the addict of a crime. The purpose of [the statute] is not to cure, but to penalize.
Were the purpose to cure, there would be no need for a mandatory jail term of not less
than 90 days .... [The statute] is, in reality, a direct attempt to punish those the State
cannot commit civilly.... We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment
if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be punished
for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action.
2 5
Justice Harlan also concurred in the result in Robinson but not on
Eighth Amendment grounds. Citing no authority, Harlan appeared to have
seen the problem in substantive due process terms, finding it an "arbitrary
imposition" of State power to apply the California statute under the
circumstances of Robinson. Assuming that the State could properly punish
narcotics use by addicts, who by definition possess a compelling propensity
to use narcotics, Harlan saw the statute's application to addicts per se as an
unconstitutional authorization of criminal punishment "for a bare desire to
commit a criminal act.",
26
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White expressed concern about the
implications of the majority opinion in Robinson. White found insufficient
evidence in the record to find that the appellant in the case had in fact been
convicted solely on the basis of his status as an addict rather than for the
27regular use of narcotics. Had such evidence existed he "would have [had]
other thoughts about the case,' 28 presumably, however, not as an Eighth
Amendment matter. In warning of the ill-advised use of the Eighth
Amendment to decide the issue in Robinson, White said:
If it is "cruel and unusual punishment" to convict appellant for addiction, it is difficult
to understand why it would be any less offensive.., to convict him for use on the
same evidence of use which proved he was an addict. It is significant that in
purporting to reaffirm the power of the States to deal with the narcotics traffic, the
would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment"
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 370 U.S. at 666.
24 Id. at 676-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 676-78.
26 Id. at 678-79 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 686 (White, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 685.
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Court does not include among the obvious powers of the State the power to punish for
the use of narcotics. I cannot think that the omission was inadvertent.
29
For White, the majority opinion cast doubt on the continued ability of states
to punish use of narcotics by addicts.3 °
Finally, Justice White chided the majority for substituting its judgment
for that of policymakers. White suggested that the majority's "novel"
application of the Eighth Amendment was a consequence of the Court's
"allergy" to substantive due process.3'
Clearly, Robinson left important questions unanswered. Did the case
stand for the narrow proposition that commission of an offense is an
essential prerequisite for punishment, thus simply constitutionalizing
traditional actus reus principles? If so, whether or not a person possesses
power to control his actions, a mens rea issue, would be irrelevant.32 Or, on
the other hand, did the Robinson Court's focus on drug addiction as a
disease entail a broader rationale, as feared by Justice White,33 extending
also to mens rea issues addressing criminal responsibility for acts inherent
in the disease?34 As shown by the discussion of the Powell case in the next
section, the broader actus reus plus mens rea interpretation appears to have
captured the meaning of Robinson.
29 Id. at 688-89; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30 370 U.S. at 688-89 (White, J., dissenting).
31 White said:
I deem this application of "cruel and unusual punishment" so novel that I suspect the Court was
hard put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the result reached today
rather than to its own notions of ordered liberty. If this case involved economic regulation, the
present Court's allergy to substantive due process would surely save the statute and prevent the
Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections upon state legislatures of Congress. I
fail to see why the Court deems it more appropriate to write into the Constitution its own abstract
notions of how best to handle the narcotics problem, for it obviously cannot match either the
States or Congress in expert understanding.
Id. at 689.
32 See Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 927, 929 n.14 (1969). One leading
commentator suggests that Robinson carries no mens rea connotations and should be read
simply as a case barring punishment for status only insofar as "status excludes any act at
all." Herbert Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 418
(1975). In his view, in light of a "vast literature" treating drug addiction, the argument that
drug addiction and acts associated with it be regarded as legally involuntary must be
abandoned. Id. at 443.
33 See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
34 Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 929.
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B. POWELL V. TEXAS
In its 1968 decision Powell v. Texas,35 the Supreme Court offered its
next and final word on the scope of Robinson. Leroy Powell, an alleged
alcoholic, was convicted of "be[ing] found in a state of intoxication in a
public place" and fined $20. On appeal Powell argued that he was afflicted
with the disease of chronic alcoholism, that his appearance in public while
drunk was not volitional, and that to punish him for that conduct would
essentially be punishing him for his disease contrary to Robinson.
The Court affirmed Powell's conviction in a 5-4 decision but divided
three ways. In a four-Justice plurality opinion, Justice Marshall rejected
Powell's constitutional claim on a variety of grounds. Marshall found the
record in the case did not clearly reveal the circumstances of Powell's
drinking bout on the day of his arrest nor his drinking problem in general
and thus provided an inadequate basis for announcing "an important and
wide-ranging new constitutional principle. 36  While recognizing that
alcoholism is a disease, Marshall found little agreement within the medical
profession regarding its causes and manifestations.37 Moreover, the record
did not provide a basis for determining what, for Marshall, was a crucial
issue in the case: the ability to distinguish between "loss of control" by
Powell once he commenced to drink and his "inability to abstain" from
drinking in the first place. 38 "Presumably a person would have to display
both characteristics in order to make out a constitutional defense, should
one be recognized.
3 9
Future recognition of such a defense was not necessarily foreclosed,
however, by other aspects of Marshall's opinion. In noting that effective
treatment of alcoholism was not at the time available, Marshall saw some
virtue in treating public aspects of alcoholism through the criminal justice
system with its fixed, relatively brief periods of confinement for offenses
such as Powell's rather than through therapeutic civil commitments that
might entail confinement for a longer period of time.40  By implication,
3' 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
36 Id. at 521-22 (plurality opinion).
31 Id. at 523.
31 Id. at 524-25.
'9 Id. at 525.
40 Id. at 529. Marshall elaborated:
Faced with this unpleasant reality, we are unable to assert that the use of the criminal process as
a means of dealing with the public aspects of problem drinking can never be defended as
rational. The picture of the penniless drunk propelled aimlessly and endlessly through the law's
"revolving door" of arrest, incarceration, release and re-arrest is not a pretty one. But before we
condemn the present practice across-the-board, perhaps we ought to be able to point to some
clear promise of a better world for these unfortunate people. Unfortunately, no such promise has
yet been forthcoming. If, in addition to the absence of a coherent approach to the problem of
2008)
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improved treatment might give more credibility to claims like those of
Powell's in the future.
Notwithstanding his view of the faulty record, Marshall addressed the
applicability of Robinson to Powell's situation by pointing out a simple
distinction: unlike the defendant in Robinson, Powell was not convicted for
his status, here a chronic alcoholic, but for his "act" of "being [appearing]
in public while drunk on a particular occasion. 41  This narrow
interpretation was attractive to Marshall:
Robinson so viewed brings this Court but a very small way into the substantive
criminal law. And unless Robinson is so viewed it is difficult to see any limiting
principle that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming, under the aegis of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the standards of
criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the country.42
Marshall specifically attempted to limit Robinson's thrust to actus reus
concerns rather than to the more expansive mens rea issues entailed in
Powell's claim that he was not criminally responsible because he could not
control his actions due to his alcoholism. Noting that the Supreme Court
"ha[d] never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea,,43
Marshall was reluctant to do so in Powell, at least
on the state of this record or on the current state of medical knowledge that chronic
alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from such an irresistible
compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control
their performance of either or both of these acts.
44
treatment, we consider the almost complete absence of facilities and manpower for the
implementation of a rehabilitation program, it is difficult to say in the present context that the
criminal process is utterly lacking in social value.
Id. at 530.
41 Id. at 532. In addressing the question of whether Powell "acted" even though he could
not help engaging in his conduct due to his alcoholism, Justice Black, in a concurring
opinion in Powell, said:
When we say that appellant's appearance in public is caused not by "his own" volition but rather
by some other force, we are clearly thinking of a force that is nevertheless "his" except in some
special sense [such as, for example, being carried into the street by someone else]. The accused
undoubtedly commits the proscribed act and the only question is whether the act can be
attributed to a part of "his" personality that should not be regarded as criminally responsible.
Almost all of the traditional purposes of the criminal law can be significantly served by
punishing the person who in fact committed the proscribed act, without regard to whether his
action was "compelled" by some elusive "irresponsible" aspect of his
personality.... Punishment of such a defendant can clearly be justified in terms of deterrence,
isolation, and treatment.
Id. at 540-41 (Black, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 533 (plurality opinion).
41 Id. at 535.
44id.
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Noting the value of leaving to the States the power to determine the broad
range of mens rea doctrines45 in light of shifting "religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man,, 46 Marshall found
that "[i]t is simply not yet the time to write the Constitutional formulas cast
in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear either to
doctors or to lawyers. 47
While Marshall's plurality denied, at least for the time being, a mens
rea component to Robinson, Justice Fortas, writing for three other
dissenting Justices, would recognize Powell's defense. Fortas saw the issue
in the case as "a narrow one": "[W]hether a criminal penalty may be
imposed upon a person suffering the disease of 'chronic alcoholism' for a
condition-being 'in a state of intoxication' in public-which is a
characteristic part of the pattern of his disease. '48 Fortas found adequate
evidence in the record to establish that Powell was an alcoholic who was
unable to resist the constant excessive consumption of alcohol which, in
turn, "leads him to 'appear in public [not] by his own volition but under a
compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism.' ' 49  Thus,
punishment of Powell was precluded by the principle of Robinson:
45 Marshall specifically noted the doctrines of insanity, mistake, justification, and duress.
Id. at 536.
46 Id. Marshall saw particular problems in the area of the insanity defense if Powell's
defense were to be successful.
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of
insanity test in constitutional terms. Yet, that task would seem to follow inexorably from an
extension of Robinson to this case. If a person in the "condition" of being a chronic alcoholic
cannot be criminally punished as a constitutional matter for being drunk in public, it would seem
to follow that a person who contends that, in terms of one test, "his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or mental defect," would state an issue of constitutional dimension with regard
to his criminal responsibility had he been tried under some different and perhaps lesser standard,
e.g., the right-wrong test of M'Naghten's Case. The experimentation of one jurisdiction in that
field alone indicates the magnitude of the problem. But formulating a constitutional rule would
reduce, if not eliminate, that fruitful experimentation, and freeze the developing productive
dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold.
Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted).
47 Id. at 537. Justice Black added other practical concerns:
[The impact of the holding urged upon us] would make it necessary to determine, not only what
constitutes a "disease," but also what is the "pattern" of the disease, what "conditions" are "part"
of the pattern, what parts of this pattern result from a "compulsion," and finally which of these
compulsions are "symptomatic" of the disease.
Id. at 546 (Black, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 558 (Fortas, J., concurring). Fortas specified that the Powell case did not
challenge "the validity of public intoxication statutes in general," nor did it deal with
intoxicated non-alcoholic drinkers appearing in public, nor with "any offense other than the
crime of public intoxication." Id.
41 Id. at 559.
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"Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a
condition he is powerless to change." 50
With the Powell Court equally split between the Marshall plurality and
the Fortas dissent, Justice White cast the decisive, concurring vote.51
However, White agreed with the dissenters' general position. White
expressed his view of Robinson as it related to the issue in Powell as
follows:
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics [under
Robinson], I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a
compulsion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction under a
different name. Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding criminal
conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running a
fever or having a convulsion. Unless Robinson is to be abandoned, the use of
narcotics by an addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law. Similarly, the
chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol should not be
punishable for drinking or for being drunk.
5
Given Justice White's views, the Powell dissent more closely states
"the principles accepted by a majority of the Court than does the plurality
opinion., 5 3 Thus while some on the Powell Court would limit Robinson to
"a firm and impenetrable barrier to the punishment of persons who,
whatever their bare desires and propensities, have committed no proscribed
wrongful act,",54 a majority of the Court would extend the case to
assessments of responsibility for actions inherent in disease conditions.
C. IMPLICATIONS: THE DEMISE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW?
A leading commentator has noted that if Justice White had joined the
dissent in Powell, the case would have "generated a precedent of
revolutionary proportions. 55  However, as noted immediately above,
White's opinion shares a much closer affinity to the dissent than to the
50 Id. at 567.
" Id. at 552-54 (White, J., concurring). Justice White concurred with the result reached
by the plurality because he found insufficient evidence in the record to show that Powell was
compelled to be intoxicated in public. Id.
52 Id. at 548-49. For a view critical of White's position, see Herbert Fingarette, The
Perils of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the "Disease of Alcoholism," 83
HARV. L. REv. 793, 794 (1970). For similar views in the context of drug addiction, see
Fingarette, supra note 32.
53 Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 93 1.
14 392 U.S. at 548 (Black, J., concurring).
55 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 429 (1978).
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plurality opinion.56 It is thus important to explore the implications of the
Powell dissent as possibly viable in shaping future law.57
Justice Marshall warned in his Powell opinion that embracing the
dissenting position would lead to the Supreme Court's becoming "the
ultimate arbiter of ... standards in diverse areas of the criminal law. 58 In
his concurring opinion in Powell, Justice Black expanded on this concern:
[A]ny possible limits proposed for the rule [urged upon us] would be wholly illusory.
If the original boundaries of Robinson are to be discarded, any new limits too would
soon fall by the wayside and the Court would be forced to hold the States powerless to
punish any conduct that could be shown to result from a "compulsion," in the
complex, psychological meaning of that term. The result, to choose just one
illustration, would be to require recognition of "irresistible impulse" as a complete
defense to any crime; this is probably contrary to present law in most American
jurisdictions.
The real reach of any such decision, however, would be broader still, for the basic
premise underlying the argument is that it is cruel and unusual to punish a person who
is not morally blameworthy.... The criminal law is a social tool that is employed in
seeking a wide variety of goals, and I cannot say the Eighth Amendment's limits on
the use of criminal sanctions extend as far as this viewpoint would inevitably carry
them.
59
Thus, "irresistible impulses" by drug addicts to steal in order to
support their habits may be a defense to theft charges brought against the
addict.60 Theft charges against "kleptomaniacs" and arson charges against
56 Even Justice Marshall's rather tentative plurality opinion suggests that he might
eventually embrace the dissent position. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40, 43-47.
57 Some have attempted to articulate limitations to the possible thrust of the Powell
dissent. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 975:
The starting point of a constitutional test in this area, therefore, should be whether the actor has a
possible defense that he can not properly be blamed for and could not have been deterred from
the wrongful act. A state should be permitted to preclude the asserted defense only if there is
substantial reason for the Court to conclude that problems of identification would make the
defense too difficult to administer or that some important purpose of punishment, not equally
well accomplished by civil remedies, is served by punishing even those who are not
blameworthy or deterrable.
Another somewhat confusing attempt to limit the Powell dissent is offered by Benno
Weisberg, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the Eighth Amendment: Applying the
Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual "Crimes," 96 J. CluM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 329, 361 (2005). The test for limiting Robinson is as follows: "[I]s the
targeted conduct only unlawful in a particular context? If so, then the conduct is innocent,
and if the defendant is unable either to escape the context, or avoid performing the conduct,
it would violate the Eighth Amendment to hold him criminally liable." Id.
58 See supra text accompanying note 42.
" 392 U.S. at 544-45 (Black, J., concurring).
60 See, e.g., Broeder & Merson, supra note 3, at 204; Note, supra note 10, at 652. For a
criticism of the concept of "irresistible impulse" as either vacuous or "so expansive that it
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"pyromaniacs" may be excused.6' Punishment of sex offenders may be
unconstitutional if the offense is "compulsive and symptomatic of
disease. 62
Ultimately, the implications of the Powell dissent may be far more
extensive than even Justices Marshall and Black recognized. Rather than
merely making the Court the "arbiter of mens rea" standards of the criminal
law, the Powell dissent might render the principle of mens rea, and indeed
the criminal law itself, a relic of the past. Recognition of the idea that
persons are not responsible for actions produced by status conditions
beyond their ability to change plants the seeds for radical change:
Considered in light of an increasingly more sophisticated science of psychiatry, the
"status one cannot change" rationale might conceivably yield results antithetical to the
criminal law itself. It has been suggested that virtually all criminality may be the
result of mental abnormality of some sort. Under this view of Robinson, the
acceptance of such a position-like the acceptance of philosophical determinism-
would lead to virtual abandonment of the criminal law; for the hypothesis upon which
any system of criminal law must be founded is that individuals possess free will and
are to be held responsible for their acts.
63
could include most criminal behavior," see Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of
Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 36-38 (2003). See also Fingarette, supra note 32, at
427 (noting that the concept of "involuntariness" is "hopelessly inappropriate" to deal with
complexity of the problems of narcotic addition). For similar views, see ROBERT F. SCHOPP,
AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 165-76 (1991).
61 See, e.g., Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L. REv.
463, 490-91 (1967).
62 See, e.g., Bason, supra note 2, at 59; Broeder & Merson, supra note 3, at 205; Note,
supra note 10, at 653. Other consequences of the Powell dissent might be, inter alia: the
abolition of "private" or victimless crimes, the elimination of strict liability crimes, and the
"emasculation" of involuntary manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide law. Broeder &
Merson, supra note 3, at 205-07.
63 Note, supra note 10, at 654; see also Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of
Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2249-51 (1992) (stating that
"acceptance of a loss-of-control defense for addicts and alcoholics could fundamentally
undermine the [criminal justice] system's capacity to articulate an ideology of individual
responsibility," thus also undermining "a central feature of our normative landscape").
The implications of extending Robinson into the mens rea area appear to reach even
beyond issues relating to mental abnormality. If it is true, as many argue (see, e.g., New
Jersey v. Sikora, 210 A.2d 193 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1964) (testimony of Dr. Noel C. Galen); John
R. Silber, Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility and Voluntary Responsibility,
35 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1967)), that all human "action" is the product of subconscious mental
activity, itself a fundamental ingredient in defining our basic status condition (who we are as
people), then all actions are necessarily linked to status conditions. On this view, there is no
distinction between being and doing, thus making punishment of any act unconstitutional
punishment of a status under Robinson. See also Sherry F. Colb, Some Thoughts on the
Conduct/Status Distinction, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 977 (1999).
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D. LOWER COURTS AND POWELL
Until the recent Jones decision, discussed in the next section, the lower
courts have generally refused to recognize mens rea defenses for acts
attributable to illnesses or other status conditions64 even though the Powell
dissent remains arguably authoritative. Attention will be directed here to
just one case denying such recognition, Moore v. United States,65 "a judicial
conversation of uncommon erudition. 66 The holding in Moore represents
the "near universal [judicial] hostility" to any version of a mens rea, lack-
of-control defense pressed by alcoholic or drug-addicted defendants under
Powell.
67
In Moore, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia considered, among other things, whether the "admittedly
confused and divergent" opinions in Robinson and Powell precluded the
conviction of a heroin addict, Moore, for possession of that substance.68
Moore argued that his addiction created an overpowering need to use and
thus to possess the drug.
64 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 181-82 (4th ed. 2003); PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW 186 (1997) ("Nothing further has come of the voluntariness language in [the
dissent of] Powell."). Professor Robinson offers the following explanation of why the
Supreme Court has gone no farther than Powell:
The Court may have realized that, despite the wisdom of having a voluntariness ... requirement,
to constitutionalize it logically would have drawn the Court into constitutionalizing, or trying to
distinguish, the host of criminal law doctrines that are based on some degree of involuntariness.
This includes not only the general disability excuses, such as insanity, duress, and involuntary
intoxication, but also doctrines of mitigation, such as provocation and extreme emotional
disturbance. Criminal law theory has struggled with and changed the accepted wisdom on these
and other issues central to criminal responsibility many times during the past century. The Court
might have thought it unwise to impede this continuing development by constitutionalizing, and
thereby solidifying, matters that ought to remain fluid until we are more certain of their proper
formulation.
ROBINSON, supra, at 186-87.
However, outside the Eighth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has utilized the
"void for vagueness" doctrine under the Due Process Clause to render unconstitutional
certain so-called "status crimes" traditionally captured under the broad rubric of "vagrancy."
See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Prior to Papachristou, many
commentators had argued that such "crimes" as being a "dissolute person," a "common
gambler," or a "habitual loafer" were status conditions perhaps unpunishable under
Robinson. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Constitutional Restrictions on the Federal
Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing
Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 234-41 (1967); Cuomo, supra note 61,
at 465-67.
65 486 F.2d 1139 (1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) (mem.).
66 Boldt, supra note 63, at 2250.
67 Id. at 2310.
68 486 F.2d at 1142.
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While there was no majority opinion for the court, a majority did
refuse to extend a defense under Powell. In his plurality opinion, Judge
Wilkey admitted that "the interpretation that Robinson held that it was not
criminal to give in to the irresistible compulsion of a 'disease[]' weaves in
and out of the Powell opinions, but there [was] definitely no Supreme Court
holding to this effect., 69  But even if the Powell dissent were viewed as
authoritative, Wilkey unconvincingly attempted to distinguish Moore on the
ground that "acquisition and possession of the addictive substance
[heroin] . . . are illegal activities, whereas in Powell the 'addict' induced his
[alcohol] addictive state through legal means.', 70  Probably the primary
reason for Wilkey's refusal to extend a Powell defense to Moore was his
concern about the implications of such a move. The "logic" of Moore's
claim, if recognized, "would carry over to all other illegal acts of any type
whose purpose was to obtain narcotics for his own use. 7 1
In a dissenting opinion joined by three other members of the Moore
court, Judge Wright observed that while Powell left the state of the law
69 Id. at 1150 (plurality opinion).
70 Id. at 1151 (emphases in original). Such a view suggests that an alcoholic is, in a
sense, innocent in becoming addicted and thus may have defenses for acts associated with
addiction. Such defenses would apparently be unavailable to heroin addicts whose
addictions are not "innocent" in the first place. Under this view, however, it is difficult to
understand why Robinson would forbid punishing heroin addiction itself given that it is
almost always the product of illegal acts.
71 Id. at 1145. Wilkey elaborated:
Under [Moore's] theory .... only if there is a resulting loss of self-control can there be an
absence of free will which, under [broad principles of criminal responsibility], would provide a
valid defense to the addict. If there is a demonstrable absence of free will (loss of self-control),
the illegal acts of possession and acquisition cannot be charged to the user of the drugs.
But if it is absence of free will which excuses the mere possessor-acquirer, the more desperate
bank robber for drug money has an even more demonstrable lack of free will and derived from
precisely the same factors as appellant argues should excuse the mere possessor.
Id. at 1145-46 (emphases in original).
In a concurring opinion, Judge Leventhal agreed that Moore had no defense under Powell
but suggested that such a defense might constitute "sound policy" if enacted legislatively.
Id. at 1160 (Leventhal, J., concurring). Judicial recognition of a constitutional defense
would cause concerns similar to those expressed by Wilkey:
If drug dependence really negatived mens rea, it would be a defense not only to the offense of
possession or purchase of prohibited drugs but to other actions taken under the compulsion of the
need to obtain the drug. If there is an impairment and lack of capacity to alter conduct, there is
no way in which the line can be drawn in mens rea terms so as to exclude the very large
percentage of addicts who must support their habit by engaging in retail sales, or, indeed,
committing other crimes in order to satisfy their compulsion for drugs.
Id. at 1179. Leventhal saw Justice White's apparent approval in principle of the Powell
dissent as not undercutting Marshall's plurality opinion. Id. at 1198. Therefore, Powell did
not require recognition of an Eighth Amendment defense in Moore.
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"obscure," Powell and Robinson appear "to stand for the proposition that an
addict cannot constitutionally be subjected to criminal process for engaging
in conduct which is itself inherent in the disease of addiction. '72 Therefore,
Wright argued that Moore could not be punished for possession of heroin
because heroin possession was logically entailed in being a heroin addict.
Judge Wright expounded on the status of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause after Robinson and Powell:
Although Powell left unsettled the precise relationship between criminal
responsibility and the Constitution, no member of the Court expressed even the
slightest disagreement with the basic proposition that the Eighth Amendment provides
only the floor and not the ceiling for development of common law notions of criminal
responsibility....
The concept of criminal responsibility is, by its very nature, "an expression of the
moral sense of the community." In western society, the concept has been shaped by
two dominant value judgments-that punishment must be morally legitimate, and that
it must not unduly threaten the liberties and dignity of the individual in his
relationship to society. As a result, there has historically been a strong conviction in
our jurisprudence that to hold a man criminally responsible, his actions must have
been the product of a "free will.". . .Thus criminal responsibility is assessed only
when through "free will" a man elects to do evil, and if he is not a free agent, or is
unable to choose or to act voluntarily, or to avoid the conduct which constitutes the
crime, he is outside the postulate of the law of punishment.
73
Judge Wright saw the Eighth Amendment's homage to "evolving
standards of decency" and protection of human dignity as particularly fertile
ground for generating constitutional principles of mens rea. 4 As "the
constitutional floor," the Amendment's abhorrence of "cruel punishment"
provided a rich doctrinal basis for bringing the Constitution to the
substantive criminal law.
In addressing "perhaps the most troublesome question arising out of
recognition of the addiction defense," Wright read Powell as indicating that
the Court's position was that the defense should be limited to acts such as
possession that are "inherent in the disease itself' rather than extend to
instances where "an addict may in fact be 'compelled' to engage in other
types of criminal activity in order to obtain sufficient funds to purchase his
necessary supply of narcotics. '7 5 Wright saw his position as "but a short
72 Id. at 1239 (Wright, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 1240-41.
14 Id. at 1235-36.
" Id. at 1255-57.
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step past the principles announced in the Supreme Court's opinions in
Robinson and Powell.,
76
Finally in a separate dissent, Judge Bazelon would go farther:
I cannot ... accept [Judge Wright's] view that the addiction/responsibility defense
should be limited to the offense of possession. I would also permit a jury to consider
addiction as a defense to a charge of, for example, armed robbery or trafficking in
drugs, to determine whether the defendant was under such duress or compulsion,
because of his addiction, that he was unable to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
77
The Moore majority's denial of a mens rea defense represents the
approach taken by the vast majority of courts after Powell. While a few
cases struck down statutes employing criminal sanctions to mere status
conditions,78 until the recent Jones case, no appellate court had invalidated
punishment of acts deemed inherently linked to status conditions.79
III. JONES: A NEW DIRECTION
Jones v. Los Angeles80 is the first federal appellate court decision to
hold that conduct derivative of a status may not be criminalized.81 As such,
the case represents a dramatic change in the direction of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
76 Id. at 1260.
77 Id. (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
78 Prior to the Supreme Court's invalidation of vagrancy statutes on due process grounds,
see supra note 64 (discussing Papachristou), some lower courts struck down "status crimes"
entailed in vagrancy statutes as unconstitutional under Robinson. See, e.g., Goldman v.
Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969) (invalidating statute prohibiting, among other
things, "loitering" or "leading an idle, immoral, or profligate course of life"); Wheeler v.
Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (striking down statute prohibiting, among other
things, being "able to work" but having no "visible and known means of a fair, honest, and
reputable livelihood").
Outside the context of vagrancy, courts sometimes also appealed to Robinson as grounds
for striking down "punishment" for status conditions. See, e.g., Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F.
Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (invalidating punishment of "wayward minors").
79 At least one federal district court had, however, invalidated such acts on Eighth
Amendment as well as due process vagueness grounds. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810
F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
80 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 04-55324, 2007 WL 3010591, at *1 (9th
Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).
81 Id. at 1139 (Rymer, J., dissenting). At least one federal district had found that the
Eighth Amendment protected homeless persons against arrests for lying down, sleeping,
standing, or performing other essential life-sustaining activities in public. See Pottinger, 810
F. Supp. at 1561-65.
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A. THE JONES CASE
In Jones, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the constitutionality of a city ordinance that criminalized
"sitting, lying, or sleeping" on public streets and sidewalks. 82 The statute
was attacked by Jones and other homeless individuals, who claimed that
enforcement of the ordinance against them constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under Robinson/Powell because conduct such as sitting or
sleeping on public streets represented involuntary actions inherently linked
to their status as homeless persons. In an opinion by Judge Wardlaw, the
court agreed with Jones and issued an injunction against enforcement of the
ordinance against homeless individuals.83
The court found that Jones and the other appellants, all of whom met
the federal definition of a "homeless individual,"8 4 lived on the streets of the
"Skid Row" district of Los Angeles, an area with the "highest concentration
of homeless individuals in the United States," where "desperate poverty,
drug use, and crime [abounds], [and] where Porta-Potties serve as sleeping
quarters and houses of prostitution., 8 5  The court noted a long-standing
policy by the City of "concentrating and containing the homeless in the
Skid Row area' 86 which, because of inadequate shelters and other
temporary housing, meant that on any given night at least 1000 people
would be relegated to city sidewalks, "the only place to be."87 Moreover,
the court found that the appellants had not chosen their homelessness but
rather that it had resulted from a variety of causes such as mental illness,
82 The statute imposed punishment of a fine up to $1000 and/or imprisonment of up to
six months. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.18(d) (2005), as cited in Jones, 444 F.3d at 1123.
83 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1127, 1138.
84 Federal law defines the term "homeless individual" to include
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and (2) an
individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is-
(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide temporary living
accommodations (including welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional housing for
the mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals intended to be
institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping
accommodation for human beings.
42 U.S.C.A. § 11302(a) (2000), as quoted in Jones, 444 F.3d at 1120-21.
85 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1121.
86 Id. (citing Edward G. Goetz, Land Use and Homeless Policy in Los Angeles, 16 INr'L
J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 540, 543 (1992)).
81 Id. at 1122-23.
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substance abuse, domestic violence, low-paying jobs and "most
significantly" from the "chronic lack of affordable housing."
88
The court saw the ordinance as "one of the most restrictive municipal
laws in the United States., 89 As a result of its "expansive reach..., the
extreme lack of available shelter in Los Angeles, and the large homeless
population, thousands of people violate the Los Angeles ordinance every
day and night, and many are arrested, losing what few possessions they may
have." 90 Based on these factors, the court concluded that "the City is
criminalizing the status of homelessness.
' 91
The court rejected the City's arguments that some of the appellants
lacked standing to raise their Eighth Amendment claim because they had
merely been cited or arrested, and some of them jailed, under the ordinance
but none convicted for its violation.92 The court cited Robinson for the
proposition that the protection of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause "governs the criminal law process as a whole, not only the
imposition of punishment postconviction. ' '93  On this view, "a person
suffers constitutionally cognizable harm as soon as he is subjected to the
8 Id. at 1123-25. The court described the circumstances of the arrests of some of the
Jones appellants. Some were on the street because they missed the bus to the shelter, others
because their welfare payments were insufficient to pay for treatment for physical and
mental afflictions, still others because physical injuries precluded them from working. The
court also noted that the police confiscated belongings such as blankets, clothes, cooking
utensils, and other personal effects that appellants had left on the street subsequent to their
arrests. Id.
89 Id. at 1123-24. The court observed that other cities' ordinances directed at the
homeless provide ways to avoid criminalizing the status of homelessness by making an
element of the crime some other conduct, such as obstructing traffic, in combination with
sitting, lying, or sleeping in a state of homelessness.
90 Id. at 1124.
"' Id. at 1125.
92 One claim for an alleged lack of standing was that if appellants had been put on trial,
they could have successfully raised necessity defenses. The court found that, while
theoretically viable, the practical realities of homelessness, including lack of effective
counsel and inducements to plead guilty, made raising such defenses highly unlikely.
Moreover, the promise of a defense at trial would hardly alleviate the preconviction harms
inflicted upon homeless people through their loss of possessions when arrested, given that
they have so few resources and may find that everything they own "may have disappeared
by the time they return to the street." Id. at 1131.
9' Id. at 1128-29. The court also appealed to a post-Robinson case, Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 657 (1977), for the proposition that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause places three distinct limits on the government's criminal law powers: "First, it limits
the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes; second, it
proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime; and third, it
imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such." But see
infra note 116 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court's view that Eighth
Amendment claims arise only after conviction and punishment).
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criminal process," an event that begins "well before conviction."94  The
court explained:
A more restrictive approach to standing, one that made conviction a prerequisite for
any type of Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause challenge, would allow the state to
criminalize a protected behavior or condition and cite, arrest, jail, and even prosecute
individuals for violations, so long as no conviction resulted. Under this approach, the
state could in effect punish individuals in the preconviction stages of the criminal law
enforcement process for being or doing things that under the Clause cannot be subject
to the criminal process.95
The court did not explain how preconviction events such as arrests or
pretrial detention were "in effect punishment," nor did it address the
Supreme Court caselaw holding that any preconviction "punishment" is per
se unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause96 and decisions
specifically holding that pretrial detention of arrestees awaiting trial is not
"punishment" for due process purposes.97
Turning to an analysis of Robinson/Powell, the court rejected the view
of the district court in Jones that homelessness was not a constitutionally
cognizable status. Given the evidence of the extent of homelessness and the
paucity of available shelter, the Jones court found that the City "encroached
upon Appellants' Eighth Amendment protections by criminalizing the
unavoidable act of sitting, lying, or sleeping at night while being
involuntarily homeless. 98 In terms reminiscent of the dissents by Fortas
and Wright in Powell and Moore, respectively,99 the court explained:
A[n] analysis of Robinson and Powell instructs that the involuntariness of the act or
condition the City criminalizes is the critical factor delineating a constitutionally
cognizable status, and incidental conduct which is integral to and an unavoidable
result of that status, from acts or conditions that can be criminalized consistent with
the Eighth Amendment.oo
94 Jones, 444 F.3d at 1129.
95 Id.
96 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (holding that pretrial detention of persons
accused of crime is not punishment due to an absence of punitive intent and that, "under the
Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt"). See
infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wolfish as it relates to Jones.
97 See supra note 96; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (pretrial
detention to protect public safety from possible criminal acts by detainee held not
"punishment"); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (preadjudication detention of juvenile
thought to pose a "serious risk" of committing additional offenses if released held not
"punishment"); infra notes 123-32, 141-52 and accompanying text.
98 444 F.3d at 1132.
99 See supra notes 48-50, 72-76 and accompanying text.
i0 444 F.3d at 1132.
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Rejecting the ultimate authority of Marshall's plurality opinion, the court
concluded that "five Justices in Powell understood Robinson" to mean "that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary
act or condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one's status or
being."' 0' 1 Such a view of Robinson was "persuasive authority" to the Jones
court while "the precedential [authority] of the Powell plurality [was]
limited to its precise facts."' 0 2 Thus, the proper inquiry should focus on
"whether volitional acts brought about the 'condition' and whether those
acts are sufficiently proximate to the 'condition' for it to be permissible to
impose penal sanctions on the 'condition.'
10 3
Therefore, because homeless individuals are in a "chronic state" that
may have been brought about "innocently and involuntarily,"'1 4 and
because "sitting, lying, and sleeping" are "biologically compelled,"
"unavoidable consequences of being human," 105 the city could not apply the
ordinance against the homeless even though its language specified various
acts rather than a status condition. 10 6 "By criminalizing sitting, lying, and
sleeping, the City is in fact criminalizing appellants' status as homeless
individuals.' 0 7
The Jones court attempted to limit its holding by announcing, "[W]e
do not hold that the Eighth Amendment includes a mens rea
requirement.' 0 8 Rather, it stated that "all we hold is that so long as there is
a greater number of homeless individuals in Los Angeles than the number
of available beds, the City may not enforce [the ordinance] at all times and
places throughout the City against homeless individuals for involuntarily
sitting, lying, and sleeping in public."'
09
Judge Rymer dissented in Jones. Rymer refused to see Jones as that
"rare type of case" where the Eighth Amendment places restrictions on the
substantive criminal law."0 Noting that Jones was breaking new Eighth
101 Id. at 1135.
102 Id.




106 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
107 444 F.3d at 1137.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1138. The court noted that the ordinance could be applied to punish conduct
such as panhandling and obstructing public roads that is not an "unavoidable consequence of
being homeless." Id. at 1137. The court also claimed no part in attending to underlying
social policy concerns, leaving it to the legislative and executive branches to deal with the
"homeless problem," perhaps by providing sufficient shelter. Id. at 1138.
110 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting.).
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Amendment ground, Rymer found the ramifications of the majority's action
"quite extraordinary." '111
Rymer saw no basis for applying Eighth Amendment protections to
parties who had merely been arrested but not convicted. He chided the
majority for its view that standing was established through the deprivations
of liberty entailed by being brought within the criminal process, noting that
"this is an action arising under the Eighth Amendment, where injury comes
from cruel and unusual punishment-not under the Due Process Clause,
where injury comes from deprivation of a liberty or property
interest .... 112 Moreover, even if standing were granted to the
unconvicted appellants, they would lose their claim of unconstitutional
punishment on the merits because they may avoid punishment by gaining
an acquittal through raising a defense of necessity.
13
Unlike the majority, Judge Rymer read Robinson and Powell narrowly,
finding that Robinson does not apply to criminalization of conduct.1 4 Thus,
the meaning of Robinson/Powell was simply that criminal penalties can be
imposed only if the accused has committed "some actus reus."
'1 15
B. ASSESSING JONES
While Judge Rymer warned that Jones portended "remarkable
ramifications," he offered no explanation of the case's significance. In fact,
no member of the Jones court suggested any hint at the meaning of the case.
This Section takes on that task by assessing Jones, first in terms of its grant
of standing to the appellants who had not been convicted for violating the
ordinance, and then in its avowal of the Powell dissent.
... Id. at 1138-39.
112 Id. at 1141. Rymer found that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause "places no
limits on the state's ability to arrest," concluding that Eighth Amendment protections "do
not attach until after conviction and sentence." In distinguishing Eighth Amendment and
due process issues, Rymer noted:
[T]here is a difference between the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment, and protection
afforded by the Fourteenth. Protection against deprivations of life, liberty and property without
due process is, of course, the role of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth. The majority's
analysis of the substantive component of the Eighth Amendment blurs the two. However, the
Eighth Amendment does not afford due process protection when a Fourteenth Amendment claim
proves unavailing.
Id. at 1141, 1147.
113 Id. at 1140, 1148.




1. "Punishment" of the Nonconvicted
The Jones court granted standing to assert an Eighth Amendment
claim to homeless appellants who had merely been cited or arrested, and in
some cases jailed, without actually being convicted of violating the Los
Angeles ordinance. The sole Supreme Court ground for the court's action
was a single phrase of dicta from a United States Supreme Court opinion
noting that the Eighth Amendment not only limits kinds and degrees of
punishment but also "imposes substantive limits on what can be made
criminal and punished as such."' 16 While such language can be read simply
to refer to Robinson and Powell, cases where sanctions were imposed
postconviction, the Jones court, either in ignorance of or simple disregard
for Supreme Court teaching to the contrary, read the phrase to mean that the
Eighth Amendment "governs the criminal law process as a whole not only
the imposition of punishment postconviction."' 1 7 Therefore, for the court,
"a person suffers constitutionally cognizable harm as soon as he is
subjected to the criminal process," possibly "well before conviction."' 1 8 In
reaching this conclusion, the Jones court disregarded the contrary view of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that Eighth Amendment relief is
available only after conviction 1 9 and relied instead on a single federal
district court case allowing standing to assert a preconviction remedy 120 and
on dicta from two other federal cases suggesting such a possibility.' 2'
Solely on this basis, the Jones court concluded that it is "well-established
Supreme Court authority"'122 that conviction is not necessary for Eighth
Amendment relief.
In applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to homeless
appellants who had merely been cited or arrested, and in some cases jailed,
the court found that such infringements on liberty "could in effect punish
individuals in the preconviction stages of the criminal law enforcement
process."'' 23  The court offered no analysis of how or why these
116 Id. at 1127-28 (majority opinion) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657
(1977)). The Jones Court did not refer to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 n.6 (1989),
where the Court described Ingraham as "confirming" the view that Eighth Amendment
protections do not attach until after conviction and sentence.
117 444 F.3d at 1128; see supra note 116.
118 444 F.3d at 1129.
119 Id. at 1129-30 (rejecting Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442, 443-45 (5th Cir.
1995)); see also supra note 116.
120 Joyce v. San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 853-54 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
121 444 F.3d at 1129 (citing Church v. Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1132, 1139 (1 1th Cir. 1994)
(suggesting but not stating that plaintiffs had not been convicted); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F.
Supp. 1551, 1559-60 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (same)).
122 Id. But see supra note 116.
123 444 F.3d at 1129; see supra text accompanying note 95.
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preconviction intrusions constituted "in effect punishment" or how such a
sanction is sufficient to trigger application of a constitutional text limited on
its face to actual "punishment."' 124  If the Jones court meant to say that
something "tantamount to punishment" is sufficient to bring the case within
the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, it is deviating from
the path taken by the Supreme Court in requiring "punishment," and
nothing but, as a necessary condition for the clause's applicability.125 On
the other hand, assuming that the Jones court meant to say that the
preconviction intrusions were in fact "punishment," serious problems arise.
Punishment is a distinct sanction that embodies a host of unique
constitutional consequences.1 26 As such, conceptual clarity is essential for
sound analysis of the text of constitutional provisions (in particular the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause) that are limited to the punitive
sanction. 127 The Jones court offered no definition of punishment nor did it
appeal to any precedent offering such. The court simply concluded that the
appellants were punished, thereby begging an essential constitutional
124 See supra note 9.
125 While it is clear that "an imposition must be 'punishment' for the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause to apply," Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 n.39 (1976), the Court
has had few occasions to define the meaning of "punishment" for Eighth Amendment
purposes. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (discussing Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958)). See infra notes 241-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's definition of punishment in all constitutional contexts.
Outside the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court and commentators alike have
traditionally employed the concept of punishment as the relevant criterion for distinguishing
when proceedings are "criminal" for purposes of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See, e.g.,
FLETCHER, supra note 55, at 409. Sometimes, however, the Court has suggested that some
sanctions, while perhaps not punitive per se, are sufficiently similar to punishment to trigger
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections. Consider, for example, Martin R. Gardner,
Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitutional
Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1982), where I examine how the
Supreme Court found certain aspects of the juvenile justice system to be punitive without
explicitly saying so.
126 The presence of the punitive sanction provides the distinguishing features of the
criminal law and distinguishes the "criminal" from civil procedures. GEORGE F. FLETCHER,
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 4-5 (1998). Criminal defendants are afforded special
protections under the Constitution such as the privilege against self-incrimination applicable
in "criminal cases" under the Fifth Amendment and the right to confront witnesses against
him in "criminal prosecutions" under the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amends. V
and VI.
Moreover, the presence of punishment is a necessary predicate for relief under the Bill of
Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445, 456-57 (1965); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,
319 (1866); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
127 See generally Gardner, supra note 125; Thomas K. Landry, "Punishment" and the
Eighth Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1607 (1996).
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question. In Part IV, I will discuss the concept of punishment in detail.
Such a discussion is not necessary here, however, in order to show that the
appellants in Jones were not "punished" in the relevant constitutional sense
by the preconviction intrusions of their liberty.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 128 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
confinement of pretrial detainees who attacked their detention as
unconstitutional punishment in the absence of an adjudication of guilt.
While viewing the detention as nonpunitive, the Court announced that any
pretrial punishment would be per se unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause. 129 For government action to constitute punishment, the action must
be motivated by punitive purposes, 130 specifically those of retribution or
deterrence.131 Thus, coercive governmental action is not punishment if it is
aimed at and reasonably achieves nonpunitive purposes other than the
concerns for retribution and deterrence unique to punishment.
1 32
In fact, no punishment as defined by Wolfish or under any other
definition was administered to the homeless appellants in Jones through the
citations, arrests, and pretrial detentions. Each of these was a governmental
action motivated by nonpunitive purposes; thus, none constituted
punishment.
Before addressing the nonpunitive nature of these actions, however,
attention should be directed to extending Eighth Amendment application to
citations and arrests per se. Both citations and arrests constitute "seizures
of the person" and are thus governed by specific provisions of the Fourth
Amendment,1 33 making Eighth Amendment coverage of such seizures on its
128 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
129 Id. at 539. The Wolfish Court stated that "under the Due Process Clause, a detainee
may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law."
Id. at 535.
130 While defining punishment in terms of a punitive purpose may appear circular, some
circularity is avoided by identifying the punitive purposes as the desire to seek retribution or
achieve deterrence. See Maria Fasarinis, Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Punishment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1671-72, 1679-81 (1980).
131 The Wolfish Court fashioned the following test for punishment: "[I]f a restriction or
condition [of pretrial detention] is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is
arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental
action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees." 441 U.S. at 539. The Court then expanded its reasoning in a footnote:
[I]n the absence of a showing of intent to punish, a court must look to see if a particular
restriction or condition, which may on its face appear to be punishment, is instead but an
incident of a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective .... Retribution and deterrence are
not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.
Id. at 539 n.20 (emphasis added).
132 Id.
133 The Fourth Amendment provides:
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face questionable. Moreover, in cases of excessive, even deadly,
governmental force in effectuating arrests, where the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause would appear to be most relevant to the arrest context,
the Supreme Court has specifically dealt with the problem under the Fourth
Amendment. 
134
As the constitutional text specifically governing the law of arrest, the
Fourth Amendment operates procedurally and does not shape substantive
criminal law doctrine.135 Thus, the Fourth Amendment would have nothing
whatsoever to say about the substantive crime of sitting on the sidewalk so
long as probable cause supported the arrest for that offense. In light of
these Fourth Amendment considerations, the Jones court makes a highly
questionable move in applying the Eighth Amendment to the citation and
arrest contexts already governed by a different constitutional provision.
The Jones court found that given their homeless status, appellants are
certain to continue sitting, lying, and sleeping in public thoroughfares and
thus face prospects of future citations and arrests that entail restrictions on
personal liberty, deprivations of property, and impositions of shame and
stigma.136  The court's position seems to be that an Eighth Amendment
remedy is available whenever one is arrested for crimes the person could
not help committing. If this is the court's view, it is difficult to see why it
would not extend to other classes of blameless persons who are subjected to
the shame and stigma inherent in being arrested and charged with a crime.
Jones would thus seem to allow an Eighth Amendment remedy for innocent
persons who are mistakenly arrested and charged with crimes they did not
commit. Such situations routinely occur where the arrests are supported by
probable cause and are thus perfectly legal under the Fourth Amendment.
If such arrests constitute "punishment" they immediately become
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
134 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force not permitted under the
Fourth Amendment to effectuate an arrest unless necessary to prevent the escape of one
posing a serious threat of death or serious injury to others); see also Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (stating that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force-deadly or not-in making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of
a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment").
135 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-4 (2d ed.
1997).
136 Jones v. Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 04-55324,
2007 WL 3010591, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).
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unconstitutional, however, under Wolfish as a due process matter, 37 whether
or not they are also "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. An
Eighth Amendment cause of action thus appears redundant and perhaps
even less extensive than presently available due process remedies. Judge
Rymer was therefore correct in his Jones dissent in concluding that issues
concerning preconviction deprivation of liberty are due process and not
Eighth Amendment matters.'38
In addition to applying an inappropriate constitutional text to the
citations and arrests, the Jones court's failure to address the conceptual
nature of punishment may create hazards in future cases. To the extent that
the Jones court attended at all to the issue of whether the citations and
arrests in the case constituted punishment, the court focused entirely on the
impact of those intrusions upon the homeless appellants, and specifically on
the impositions of shame and stigma. The court never addressed the
possible underlying purposes of the citations and arrests. Contrary to the
purposive approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Wolfish, 139 the Jones
court's sole focus on the negative effects 140 of citations and arrests on their
recipients may lead future courts to conclude that since anyone receiving
citations and being arrested suffers shame and stigma, all citations and
arrests constitute punishment. Such a conclusion would render all citations
and arrests unconstitutional pretrial punishment under Wolfish, a huge step
towards the "demise of the criminal law" at least in its ability to bring to
justice those who violate its provisions.
Of course the way to avoid such slippery slope implications would be
to limit punitive citations and arrests to the facts of Jones or to other
contexts where the afflicted persons in some sense supposedly "could not
help" being arrested. Such limitations explained by the Jones court would
have been helpful to at least create the impression that the court had thought
about the implications of its decision.
Aside from its inattention to relevant constitutional texts outside the
Eighth Amendment, the Jones court commits its most egregious error in
concluding that preconviction punishment was visited upon the homeless
appellants. Citations and arrests are simply not "punishments" under
Wolfish.' 41 Citations are official summonses directing a person to appear
137 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
140 For a discussion of the "punitive effect" definition of punishment, see Fasarinis, supra
note 130, at 1675-78; Gardner, supra note 125, at 811-12.
141 See supra note 131.
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before a court. 142 As alternatives to "full custody" arrests, police often issue
citations to persons they have "probable cause" to believe have violated the
law. 143 The citation process amounts to a brief detention of the suspect
while the officer issues the citation. Once issued, the suspect is released.
144
The purpose of the citation is to initiate a criminal action and direct the
suspect to appear in court on a set date to respond to the charge specified in
the document. Such purposes serve the administrative goal of bringing
suspects into the criminal justice system, which may or may not eventually
dispense punishment. Because being issued a citation is an intrusion
supported by legitimate nonpunitive objectives, it is not punishment under
Wolfish.
145
Arrests also require probable cause and serve essentially the same
purposes as citations but entail taking the suspect into custody in order to
charge him with a crime. 146 Moreover, warrantless searches "incident to
arrest" are generally allowed to a greater extent than similar searches
subsequent to the issuance of a citation. 47 Arrests serve administrative
purposes and thus do not constitute punishment.
48
The Jones court also found the pretrial detention of the homeless
appellants to be cruel and unusual punishment. Such a finding is even more
surprising than the court's conclusions regarding citations and arrests given
that three Supreme Court cases have specifically held that pretrial detention
is not punishment. 49 The Court has held that such detention is directed at
the nonpunitive purposes of assuring that suspects appear for trial 50 or do
not commit criminal offenses while awaiting trial.'
5'
The Jones court made no attempt to show that the jailing of the
homeless appellants was for any punitive purpose or was excessive in light
142 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS,
QUESTIONS 8 (11 th ed. 2005).
143 Id.
144 id.
145 See supra note 131.
146 See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 142. Arrests constitute nonpunitive detention to
allow the processing of a criminal case. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial
Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 335, 362 (1990).
147 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 174-89 (4th ed. 2004).
148 See supra note 13 1. Even if the police had used excessive force in arresting the
homeless appellants, they still would not have been subjected to punishment: "The use of
force against persons who.., have been arrested but not convicted, is not punishment in the
Eighth Amendment sense. It may be many things, but it is not punishment." Landry, supra
note 127, at 1636.
149 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
ISo See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539.
151 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739; Schall, 467 U.S. at 253.
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of articulated nonpunitive purposes. 52 Without such a showing, the court's
finding of punishment is unjustified and directly at odds with Supreme
Court precedent.
The abject failure of the Jones court to even raise the issue of whether
citations, arrests, and pretrial jailing could be punishment in light of
relevant Supreme Court caselaw defining punishment renders the decision
analytically bankrupt. Therefore, the decision to grant standing to the
unconvicted appellants does not command adherence by courts considering
this issue in future cases.
2. Punishment of the Convicted
The Jones court is on firmer ground, however, in concluding that the
appellants convicted of violating the city ordinance and convicted
thereunder were subjected to unconstitutional punishment under
Robinson/Powell. The court extends Powell to invalidate punishment for
acts inherently linked to a status condition resulting through no fault of the
offender. Given the ambiguity of Powell, such an extension is
understandable. It is, in fact, less surprising that Jones so extended Powell
than that prior courts, through no more than judicial restraint, had failed to
do so.
While the Jones court claims that they are not holding that "the Eighth
Amendment includes a mens rea requirement, ' 153 it appears that that is
exactly what they hold. The point of Jones is not that the appellants did not
"act" (they clearly "sat," "lay," etc.) but that they could not help such
actions given their homeless status. 154 Jones thus resurrects the concerns
raised earlier that recognition of a mens rea component to Robinson would
have a revolutionary impact on the criminal law.
1 55
As Justice Fortas and Judge Wright had done in the past,1 56 the Jones
court attempted to limit its decision to the facts of the particular case.
157
But, as Justice Black suggested in his Powell concurrence, such a limitation
152 See supra note 131.
153 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
154 Justice Black's observations about the "actions" of Powell are on point here. See
supra note 41. The Jones court's conclusion would have been more convincing had it drawn
a distinction between cases where homeless people choose to sit, lie down, or go to sleep in
public and those where they do everything they can to avoid sitting, lying down, or falling
asleep in public but lose consciousness (faint from exhaustion, etc.) and are found "sitting,
lying, or sleeping" in public. In the former case, "action" independent of homeless status
clearly exists, while in the latter, no action is present and thus any state response would be
directed solely to homeless status.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 43-47, 59-63, and 71.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 48 and 75-76.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
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appears to be no more than "illusory" judicial fiat.158 After all, if homeless
people cannot be punished for their "biologically compelled" acts of sitting
or sleeping in public,' 59 they would also seemingly be immune from
punishment for such similar criminal but biologically compelled actions as
public urination and defecation and the "indecent exposure" inherent
therein. If homeless people cannot be punished for the "unavoidable
consequences of being human,"'160 their public sex acts would arguably also
be unpunishable. If homeless people steal blankets to keep from freezing
while sitting on the streets, it is difficult to see, in principle, how they could
be punished for theft after Jones. Similarly, assuming that indigency is a
common aspect of homelessness,161 when economically impoverished
homeless persons rob or steal to satisfy the biologically compelled need for
food and drink, they also would appear to have a defense under Jones.
Furthermore, why in principle would Jones be limited to the homeless?
Why would homeless people be protected from punishment for their
criminal acts inherent in their homeless status without similar protections
being afforded to alcoholics and drug addicts who commit criminal acts
linked to their "disease status"? Surely pedophiles will soon make
compelling arguments under Jones that their sexual acts are compulsive,
irresistible actions inherent in their "disease"1 62 and are thus unpunishable
under the Eighth Amendment. While Justice Marshall hoped that Robinson
would bring the Constitution "but a very small way into the substantive
criminal law,"'163 the course taken by the Jones court would again thrust
Robinson deeply into the bowels of the law's longstanding struggle to
define the contours of the mens rea principle.'64
158 See supra text accompanying note 59.
159 See supra text accompanying note 105.
160 Jones v. Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 04-55324,
2007 WL 3010591, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).
161 Several of the Jones appellants were described as suffering severe economic
deprivation. See id. at 1124-25.
162 The Supreme Court has recognized pedophilia as a "serious mental disorder" or
"mental abnormality" that prevents afflicted persons from "exercising adequate control" over
their dangerous behavior. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-63 (1997). Some
members of the Court would go so far as to see pedophiles as "mentally ill" persons who
suffer from "a classic case of irresistible impulse, namely, [that they] cannot 'control the
urge' to molest children ...." Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Kansas v. Crane,
534 U.S. 407 (2002) (discussing the inability of"exhibitionists" to control themselves).
163 See supra text accompanying note 42.
164 For an examination of the historical evolution of mens rea, see Martin R. Gardner,
The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and
Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635.
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The Jones approach would thus appear to unleash anew all the
concerns involved in the constitutionalization of mens rea.165 Surely Justice
Marshall counseled wisely in advocating that trust be placed in legislative
bodies to determine the broad range of mens rea doctrines in light of
shifting "religious moral, philosophical and medical views of the nature of
man."
166
In holding that acts inherent in status conditions cannot be punished
under the Eighth Amendment, Jones reaches a conclusion contrary to that
reached by the D.C. Circuit in Moore.167 Moreover, in granting standing to
pretrial appellants, Jones is directly at odds with a contrary holding of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 168 With the direction suggested by Jones, it
is time for the Supreme Court to finally clarify the meaning of
Robinson/Powell. In resolving the standing issue, the Court is urged to
follow the analysis presented above.' 
69
The Court should also reject the position of the Jones court on the
merits-that the Constitution forbids punishment for acts intrinsic to status
conditions. Such rejection should not involve the total rejection of
Robinson, however. As will be shown in Part V, the Robinson Court was
165 See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text. For agreement that Jones has indeed
unleashed these concerns, see Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Ninth
Circuit Holds That "Involuntary Conduct Cannot Be Punished, " Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, 444 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REv. 829 (2007); see also Sara Gerry,
Recent Development, Jones v. City of Los Angeles: A Moral Response to One City's Attempt
to Criminalize, Rather than Confront, Its Homelessness Crisis, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
239 (2007); infra note 293 and accompanying text.
For arguments in favor of extending Eighth Amendment relief to the homeless, see
Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for Expanding the
Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 293 (1996); Weisberg, supra note 57.
166 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. See generally Fingarette, supra note
52 (arguing that it is unwise to fashion mens rea defenses linked to diseases as matters of
constitutional law given the variety of policy uncertainties). See also supra text
accompanying note 59 (regarding the views of Justice Black); infra note 293.
167 United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (1973); see supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Moore.
168 See Johnson v. Dallas, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995) (denying standing to raise Eighth
Amendment claims to homeless persons who had not been convicted).
169 See supra text accompanying notes 123-53. In urging a denial of Eighth Amendment
standing, I do not intend to minimize the plight of the homeless. See Tanene Allison,
Confronting the Myth of Choice: Homelessness and Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 253 (2007) (providing a first-hand discussion of some of the problems
encountered by homeless people). Certainly attention should be directed to the problem by
both the public and private sectors. When appropriate in particular cases, the necessity
defense should be made available at trial as noted by Judge Rymer. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text. But as previously argued supra in notes 116-52 and accompanying text,
it would require turning the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause on its head to grant
standing to the nonconvicted homeless appellants.
[Vol. 98
RETHINKING ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA
correct in concluding that status conditions cannot be criminalized but
should have reached its decision on more narrow constitutional grounds.
By misapplying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause the Court
opened the door to a broad judicial consideration of mens rea principles, as
evidenced by the unfortunate decision in Jones. Before detailing in Part IV
the erroneous use of the Eighth Amendment in Robinson, it is helpful to
review how that Court's choice of doctrine led from the question of whether
an action is required as a prerequisite to punishment to a judicial inquiry
into when one is criminally responsible for his actions.
3. Robinson, the Eighth Amendment, and Jones
As evidenced by Justice White's dissenting opinion, 170 Robinson was
controversial from its inception, particularly in the Court's choice of the
Eighth Amendment as the basis of the opinion. Apart from merely citing a
single case dealing with a death penalty issue,'71 the majority offered no
explanation of how or why the Eighth Amendment applied in Robinson.
Justice Douglas attempted such in his concurring opinion, arguing that
Robinson fell within the Court's proportionality cases. 172  But as others
have pointed Out, 17 3 the problem in Robinson was not that the sanction at
issue was excessive but rather that it was imposed at all. The point of
Robinson was that drug addiction, a status condition, could not be subjected
to the criminal sanction.
It thus remains a mystery why the Court chose the Eighth Amendment
as the vehicle to address the problem posed in Robinson.174 Perhaps it was
simply the only plausible constitutional alternative given the Court's
170 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 20.
172 See supra text accompanying note 24.
173 See supra note 2.
174 One commentator says this: "[T]he Court's opinion attempts no real explanation or
justification for the decision reached. It merely says it is cruel and unusual to punish one for
merely being sick. But why?" Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due
Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REv. 322, 386 (1966). Another
finds an "absence of any obvious rationale for [the] decision." Fingarette, supra note 52, at
796. On the other hand, only the Eighth Amendment and, perhaps, the prohibitions against
ex post facto law specifically speak to substantive matters within the criminal law.
Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 1.
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"allergy" at the time to substantive due process, 175 the doctrine under which
Justice Harlan would have decided Robinson.1
76
But if the Court was hoping to choose a more narrow constitutional
ground with its choice of the Eighth Amendment than would have been the
case under due process, the choice ironically appears to have had the
opposite effect. 177 By choosing the language of "cruel punishment" under
the Eighth Amendment with its attendant concerns for protecting "human
dignity" and "humane treatment,"1 78 the Court invited a broad inquiry into
the host of normative issues involved in assessing blameworthiness in an
"age of enlightenment" concerned with prohibiting "barbarous actions."'' 79
Under such doctrinal footing, it is not surprising that some would see the
Eighth Amendment as the constitutional "floor" for developing criminal
responsibility doctrines necessary to assure the "moral legitimacy" of
punishment. 80 Such doctrines are not, of course, limited to actus reus
issues but also preclude "the law of punishment" from being applied to
those whose actions are not the product of "free will" or who are "unable to
avoid" the commission of criminal offenses. ' 8'
Jones is thus perhaps the inevitable result of the Court's choice of
deciding Robinson under the Eighth Amendment. This choice was
misguided from the beginning. As will be shown in the next section, the
Court misapplied the Eighth Amendment in Robinson because the punitive
sanction was never at issue in the case.
175 See text at supra note 31. Since the time of Robinson, the Supreme Court has more
actively applied the Due Process Clause to invalidate criminal statutes. See, e.g., Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating statutes punishing sodomy); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating statutes punishing abortion).
176 See supra text accompanying note 26. See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras,
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case,
64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 256 n.72 (1965); Packer, supra note 4.
177 At first glance, the Due Process Clause would appear to afford a broader ground for
decision than "the more specific cruel and unusual punishment standard." Cuomo, supra
note 61, at 478, n.78; see also Jeffrey A. Rowe, Revisiting Robinson: The Eighth Amendment
as Constitutional Support for Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 95, 107-08 (2005). As will be shown in Part V infra, however,
the due process rationale actually yields a much narrower decision in Robinson than does the
Eighth Amendment (discussed immediately hereafter).
178 The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment "is nothing less than the dignity
of man," and protection against "inhuman treatment." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1958).
179 See supra text accompanying note 25. Some commentators shortly after Robinson
predicted that the "decency test" of the Eighth Amendment would not yield a broad inquiry
into questions of criminal responsibility, at least not without "considerable distortion" of the
history and theory of excuses. Dubin, supra note 174, at 393.
18o See supra text accompanying note 73.
181 Id.
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IV. ROBINSON: PUNISHMENT OR MALISHMENT?
As mentioned earlier, governmental imposition of punishment carries
with it unique constitutional consequences not necessarily attendant to other
legal sanctions. 18 As is clear from the Wolfish case,' 83 the Court sometimes
appeals to the concept of punishment to decide cases under constitutional
texts that neither specifically speak to the "criminal" process nor explicitly
speak in terms of "punishment."'184  While some have criticized such
utilization of the concept of punishment as an "empty semantic exercise,"'
185
in Eighth Amendment cases defining the Amendment's scope on the basis
of the presence or absence of punishment is essential given the fact that
"punishment" is a necessary prerequisite for applicability of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.' 
86
"Punishment" thus requires careful definition in order for proper
application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. After sketching
a definition derived from the philosophical literature and the relevant
caselaw, I argue that the sanction employed in Robinson was not
punishment, but instead constituted what I call "malishment." Thus,
Robinson was not a case involving cruel and unusual punishment.
A. THE CONCEPT OF PUNISHMENT: THE PHILOSOPHIC VIEW
Philosophers are interested in two kinds of issues involving
punishment: the definitional inquiry into the meaning of the concept and the
normative examination of whether the imposition of punishment is morally
justifiable. 87 The definitional inquiry is of philosophical interest primarily
because it is deemed essential to avoid blurring definitional and
justificatory issues so that definitions do not foreclose justificatory
examination. 188 Conflating the definitional and justificatory questions
182 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
184 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (retroactive termination of Social
Security benefits not violative of Ex Post Facto Clause because termination did not
constitute "punishment").
185 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 569 n.7 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Rather than invoke the concept of punishment, Justice Marshall advocated a straight
balancing test that weighed the liberty interests of pretrial detainees against the state's
asserted interests.
186 See infra note 205 and accompanying text; infra note 270.
187 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970) (noting that "recent
influential articles have quite sensibly distinguished between questions of definition [of
punishment] and justification"); J. KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 11 (1973).
188 EDMOND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 56 (1966) ("[W]e want
to avoid allowing any part of the justification (or dis-justification) of punishment to creep
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renders it more difficult to pursue the conceptual analysis required by the
definitional project and more difficult to pursue the normative analysis
required by the justificatory project. It is therefore "the beginning of
wisdom" to distinguish questions of the definition of punishment from
questions of its justification. 1
89
Probably the most widely accepted characterization of the "standard
case" or definition of legal punishment within the philosophical literature is
that of H.L.A. Hart:
(i) [Punishment] must involve pain or other consequences normally considered
unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by0an authority constituted by a legal
system against which the offence is committed.
For present purposes, conditions (ii) and (iii) are of central importance.
Punishment must be for an offense against legal rules and must be visited
upon an offender for violating those rules.
In order to avoid stopping, by definition, retributivist accusations that
utilitarianism justifies framing and punishing innocent persons, or
"scapegoats"'' (an accusation stopped by definition if condition (iii) is
necessary for punishment), 192 Hart also identifies several cases of "sub-
standard" punishment. 193  To avoid the definitional stop of the classic
into its definition, so that a case for acceptance or rejection or reform can seem to turn on
'the very meaning' of punishment.").
"' H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment 4, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1969). Incidentally, Hart also urges a
distinction between two types of justificatory issues: the "general justifying aim" and the
"distribution" of punishment. Id. (I am indebted to my colleague, Bob Schopp, for
suggestions in wording the above paragraph.)
190 Id. at 4-5.
191 Defenders of utilitarian theory sometimes employ a "definitional stop" response to
retributivists who accuse utilitarianism of justifying punishment of the innocent. The
definitional stop argument is that it is a contradiction in terms to speak of "punishing" the
innocent, and the utilitarian justification for punishment is a theory only about punishment.
See Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 939 n.61. See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, in PUNISHMENT, SELECTED READINGS 58 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1975).
192 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
193 Hart includes punishment for violations of non-legal rules imposed within families or
schools, of legal rules imposed by non-designated officials, and for vicarious punishment for
actions done by others. Hart, supra note 189.
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scapegoat objection to utilitarian justifications of punishment, Hart includes
in his definition "punishment of persons.. . who neither are in fact nor
supposed to be offenders."' 94 Thus, condition (iii) of the standard case is
abandoned in order for consideration of the argument that utilitarianism
justifies the "punishment" of scapegoats. Note, however, that even in this
and the other sub-standard cases of punishment, a breach of a rule is still an
essential prerequisite of punishment. 195
Others have added to Hart's conditions. 196 However, the requirement
of an offense or undesirable action is invariably articulated as a prerequisite
for punishment. "Punishment is always for something"1 97: violating a "rule
of law, ' 198 committing an "offense,' ' 99 or performing a "wrongful act"200;
"[n]o ordinary sense of the word punishment includes inflictions that are
unrelated to prior wrongdoing. 201
Since punishment is always for an offense, it is also, in a sense,
"determinate" in proportion to the seriousness of the offense. 20 2  The
determinacy of punishment is often added to Hart's conditions as a defining
characteristic of punishment. Thus, as one commentator puts it, we are
punishing someone if, among other things consistent with Hart's conditions,
"we determined-within at least some limits-at the time of our decision to
punish what the nature and magnitude of the [inflicted] unpleasantness
194 id.
195 See supra note 193.
196 See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 187 (punishment by definition expresses social
disapprobation); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 310, 318 (2d ed.
1960) (punishment is logically related to harmful conduct and moral culpability); HERBERT
L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 21, 31 (1968) (in addition to Hart's five
conditions, a sixth should be added: punishment must be imposed for the dominant purpose
of preventing offenses against legal rules or of exacting retribution from offenders, or both).
197 A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 6,
10 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
198 See Rawls, supra note 191, at 61; Thomas Hobbes, On Punishments and Rewards, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 197, at 3.
199 See Kurt Baier, Is Punishment Retributive?, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 197, at 16.
200 See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT, SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 191, at 74, 78.
201 Landry, supra note 127, at 1627. The word "punishment" is, however, sometimes
used metaphorically as when one boxer "punishes" another. 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY
29 (1967). Commission of an offense is, however, a necessary feature of the "standard case"
of punishment involved whenever the sanction is employed by the state. Id. "[P]unishment
can only exist in relation to a past wrong." Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARv. L. REV.
1429, 1432 (2001).
202 Criminal sentences are in a sense "fixed" by the concept of proportionality between
offense and punishment. See Cuomo, supra note 61, at 507.
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would be."2°3 In contrast to the determinate nature of punishment, legal
responses to status conditions-reflected in civil commitment of the
mentally ill and confinement of the dangerous-tend to be indeterminate at
the time of their imposition.20 4
B. PUNISHMENT AND THE COURTS
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that "an imposition must
be 'punishment' for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to
apply," 205 the Court has rarely addressed the question of whether a given
penalty constituted punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. The issue
simply has not often been relevant because in most of its cases punishment
was clearly present and the only issue was whether the punishment was
cruel.206
Leaving aside the prison conditions cases discussed later, when the
Court has specifically addressed the punishment issue, it has employed a
punitive purpose approach similar to that described in the above discussion
of the Wolfish case.207 Thus, in Trop v. Dulles,2 °8 an early case, the Court
addressed the question of whether denaturalization of persons convicted by
court-martial for wartime desertion constituted punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. The Court rejected the Government's argument that
the sanction was not punitive but rather a regulatory exercise of the
congressional war power necessary to maintain military discipline. The
Court found that the denaturalization was imposed for purposes of
203 Richard Wasserstom, Some Problems with Theories of Punishment, in JUSTICE AND
PUNISHMENT 173, 178-79 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds., 1977); see also Morris, supra
note 200, at 78 (noting that "with punishment there is an attempt at some equivalence
between the advantage gained by the wrongdoer-partly based upon the seriousness of the
interest invaded, partly on the state of mind with which the wrongful act was performed-
and the punishment meted out").
204 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (noting the "indefinite
duration" of the commitment of "mentally abnormal" sex offenders under Kansas statute);
Wasserstrom, supra note 203 (finding that with coerced therapy, the decision as to
appropriate treatment is always subject to revision upon a showing that an alternative
response would be more beneficial or the patient's condition has improved so as to no longer
require a therapeutic response).
205 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 n.39 (1976).
206 For example, in numerous cases the Court has assessed the constitutionality under the
Eighth Amendment of the death penalty. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Also, in several cases the Court has examined whether clearly punitive sentences of
incarceration are unconstitutionally excessive in relation to the underlying offense. See, e.g.,
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
207 See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
208 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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"reprimanding the wrongdoer" and "to deter others" and thus was
punitive. 09 Moreover, although the Trop Court was sharply divided, four
Justices in the plurality and four in dissent suggested that the definition of
punishment should be analyzed separate from and prior to the issue of
cruelty under the Eighth Amendment. 10
Unfortunately, the Court has failed to employ in subsequent cases the
approach taken by the Trop Justices. The cases, particularly those relating
to prison life, suggest considerable confusion because the Court has, in
some instances, simply begged the punishment question or, in others, failed
to treat it as analytically distinct from, and logically prior to, the question of
cruelty.
The issue of defining punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes has
arisen most often in the context of civil rights actions brought by prison
inmates who attack prison conditions or actions of prison officials. While it
is clear that such inmates are being punished by being incarcerated in the
first place, it is not always clear whether allegedly cruel situations occurring
in prison constitute punishment for the particular crime leading to the
inmate's imprisonment, for an act committed while in prison, or perhaps for
no act at all.211
In Estelle v. Gamble,1 2 the Court held that an inmate could not
establish that inadequate medical care constituted cruel and unusual
punishment without showing "deliberate indifference" to his medical needs
by the prison doctors. The Court specified that "deliberate indifference" by
prison officials to "the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"' thus supporting a cause of
action under the Eighth Amendment.21 3 The Court did not explain,
however, whether the "deliberate indifference" factor supplied the punitive
purpose element necessary to the definition of punishment 2 4 or whether it
constituted the "cruelty" of punishment already defined.21 5  It appeared,
209 Id. at 96 (plurality opinion).
210 Id. at 94-100 (plurality opinion), 124 (dissenting opinion). The ninth Justice, Justice
Brennan, did not utilize the Eighth Amendment in his analysis of the problem in Trop, but
relied instead upon a theory of congressional abuse of the war power. Brennan agreed with
the plurality that denationalization was punitive and found that it constituted an
unnecessarily harsh exercise of the war power. Id. at 105-14 (Brennan, J., concurring).
211 For a thorough treatment of these cases, see generally Landry, supra note 127.
212 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
213 Id. at 104.
214 See supra notes 128-32, 209, and accompanying text.
215 See also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) where the Court denied an Eighth
Amendment claim by a prison inmate who was shot in the leg by a guard attempting to quell
a prison riot. The Court observed that the guard's action "did not purport to be punishment
at all" but rather an action undertaken to "resolve a disturbance." Id. at 319-20. The Court
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however, to adopt the latter view by observing that "these elementary
principles establish the government's obligation to provide medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.
216
In Wilson v. Seiter,17 a case rejecting a claim that general prison
conditions 218 constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the Court did attend
to the issue of whether the deliberate indifference requirement (the culpable
state of mind factor) defines punishment or cruelty. Interestingly, the Court
suggested it might apply to either depending on the circumstances. In cases
where a punishment is defined by statute and imposed by a sentencing
judge, a "culpable state of mind" might be required to make the punishment
"cruel. 219  On the other hand, if neither statute nor sentencing judge
specified particular harsh treatment alleged to be "punishment, ''220 the
specified, however, that had the guard's action been the product of "obduracy and
wantonness" or imposed "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm," it would have fallen under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id. at 319-21.
The Court did not explain whether the intent requirement was necessary to render the action
"punishment" or to establish its "cruelty."
216 429 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added). The Court has offered some clarification of the
"deliberate indifference" standard. A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement "only if he knows that inmates
face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
For an argument that Estelle v. Gamble dealt with issues of the government's duty to care
for and protect those in its custody rather than with issues of cruel punishment, see Philip M.
Genty, Confusing Punishment with Custodial Care: The Troublesome Legacy of Estelle v.
Gamble, 21 VT. L. REv. 379 (1996). On this theory, Estelle should have been decided as a
substantive due process case, not as an Eighth Amendment case. Id.
217 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
218 The petitioner, Wilson, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $900,000 in
damages for prison overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space,
inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean restrooms, unsanitary dining
facilities, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates. Id. at 296.
219 Id. at 299. Thus, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947),
where the state sought to impose a second electrocution of a prisoner sentenced to death after
the first attempt failed due to a malfunction of the electric chair-the prisoner's attempt to
bar the second electrocution because the first attempt constituted cruel and unusual
punishment failed because "the officials lacked the culpable state of mind necessary for the
punishment to be regarded as 'cruel,' regardless of the actual suffering inflicted." Wilson,
501 U.S. at 299.
220 For an alleged deprivation within a prison to qualify as "punishment," it must satisfy
an "objective component" determining whether the deprivation is "sufficiently serious" to
form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. Thus, for
example, a mere allegation of lodging two inmates in a single cell was not sufficiently
serious to trigger an inquiry into the "subjective" deliberate indifference issue. Id.
(describing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)).
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treatment is not punishment unless it is imposed with deliberate
indifference by prison officials.22'
The Wilson Court saw the statutorily defined and judicially imposed
punishment as being sent to prison in general, not being sent to prison as
defined by all the harsh and unpleasant conditions that exist in prison.222
Thus, for those conditions to be "punishment," they must be imposed
through the "deliberate indifference" of prison officials. The Wilson Court
insisted that an "intent requirement" is implicit in the word
"punishment., 223  "If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as
punishment by the statute or sentencing judge, some mental element must
be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify., 224 Because it
could not be shown that the prison conditions were the product of the
"deliberate indifference" of prison officials, the conditions did not
constitute "punishment" and thus the Eighth Amendment was inapplicable.
The negative implication of Wilson is that if the prison officials had
imposed harsh and unpleasant prison conditions225 through "deliberate
indifference" to the basic needs of the inmates, the conditions would have
constituted "punishment." But if punishment is always "for something,,
226
for what would the inmates be punished? Not for the crimes which
triggered their sentences, since the punishment for those crimes is the
prison sentence in general, not the prison sentence as defined by all its
inherent conditions.227  One is left with the conclusion that such
"punishment," similar to that in Robinson, would be for a status condition,
here that of being an inmate.228
221 Id.
222 Id. at 301. The Court found "no basis" for the position that "all conditions that exist
in prison, even though prison officials neither know nor have reason to know about them,
constitute 'punishment."' Id. at 301 n.2.
223 Id. at 300.
224 Id.
225 See supra note 220.
226 See supra text accompanying note 197.
227 See supra text accompanying note 222.
228 The Wilson Court quoted a view that "the infliction of punishment is a deliberate act
intended to chastise or deter," 501 U.S. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645,
652 (7th Cir. 1985)). The Court offered no explanation of how "punishing" inmates for
merely being in a prison would make sense as chastisement or deterrence.
If "deliberate indifference" to the basic needs of inmates constitutes "punishment" for the
status of being an inmate, constitutional problems surely arise. But such problems do not
appear to raise Eighth Amendment issues. Similar to the situation in Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussed infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text), deliberate
indifference to the needs of inmates appears more a situation of gratuitous cruelty than of
harsh punishment for an offense. Thus the remedy would lie under the Due Process, rather
than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id.
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A similar conclusion follows from the Court's decision in Hudson v.
McMillian2 29 which held that excessive physical force by a guard against an
inmate constitutes cruel and unusual punishment if it is administered
maliciously and sadistically. The Court did not discuss how or why the
guard brutality would constitute "punishment," although Justice Thomas in
dissent suggested that the issue had been left open230 and would be a
"critical question" in future cases of this type which might find "isolated
and unauthorized" acts not to be punishment, thus rendering McMillian a
"dead letter.,
231
The Court has yet to address Thomas's "critical question" of how the
Eighth Amendment's punishment requirement is met by guard brutality or,
for that matter, by "deliberate indifference" to the basic needs of inmates.
Without clarification of this question, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is
set adrift from its textual moorings. If, for example, it is "punishment"
when a guard brutalizes a prisoner, would it not similarly be punishment,
Given the passive nature of "deliberate indifference," such a response to the needs of
inmates qua inmates raises a different type of due process problem than that raised by
Robinson where the state actively attempted to punish a status condition. Robinson
constituted a situation which I characterize as "malishment" (see infra notes 250-63 and
accompanying text), rather than simply as a case of gratuitous state cruelty. Robinson
manifested an institutionalized attempt to statutorily impose punishment (malishment) for a
status. In the deliberate indifference cases, on the other hand, inmates suffer not as a
consequence of statutorily imposed institutionalized cruelty but rather through the ad hoc
nonfeasance of state officials.
By the same token, instances of active cruelty against inmates such as malicious guard
brutality (see supra note 215 (discussing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986))) do not
constitute malishment cases, nor punishment ones for that matter (see discussion of Johnson,
481 F.2d 1028, infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text), but instead ad hoc instances of
governmental cruelty actionable under the Due Process Clause. Johnson, 481 F.2d 1028; see
also Genty, supra note 216.
229 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
230 The grant of certiorari in McMillian was limited to the question of whether a single
incident of force upon an inmate by prison officials which did not cause a significant injury
could be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 17 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The
majority answered the question affirmatively, so long as the officials "maliciously and
sadistically" used force to cause harm," a situation that violates "contemporary standards of
decency" under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9.
231 503 U.S. at 22 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was joined by Justice
Scalia in his McMillian dissent. In subsequent cases Thomas and Scalia have raised
"substantial doubts" that the Eighth Amendment proscribes "prison deprivations that are not
inflicted as part of a sentence," Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 42 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (majority found inmate exposure to environmental tobacco smoke actionable
under the Eighth Amendment), and have found that restrictions to prison visitation are "not
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment," Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.
126, 145 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (majority found visitation restriction for inmates
with two substance-abuse violations did not constitute "inhumane prison conditions" so as to
trigger Eighth Amendment applicability).
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thus raising an Eighth Amendment claim, if a police officer simply
approaches a citizen on the street and for no reason beats her with his
baton? If it is punishment for prison medical officials to be deliberately
indifferent to an inmate's medical needs, would it not similarly be
punishment, again raising Eighth Amendment claims, if state officials are
deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of patients in a state mental
institution?
232
Punishment is by definition a response to an offense.233 To see
"punishment" in the police brutality and mental hospital examples just
mentioned is to substitute cruelty for punishment, thus collapsing the Eighth
Amendment terms "cruel" and "punishment" into a single concept:
cruelty.234 Such a situation cannot constitute a sound state of constitutional
interpretation. As noted by a careful commentator, "Eighth Amendment
doctrine will make sense only if courts diligently link a purported
punishment to a crime, 235 or at least to an underlying noncriminal
offense.236
232 The Supreme Court appears to have ruled that Eighth Amendment remedies are
unavailable to involuntarily committed mental patients even if hospital officials are
"deliberately indifferent" to their medical and psychological needs. See Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312 (1982) (holding lower court erroneously instructed jury in
Estelle's "deliberate indifference" standard in case of patient's allegations of unsafe
conditions in hospital in which he was confined). The Court noted with approval the
position of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that the "Eighth Amendment, prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crime, was not an appropriate source for
determining the rights of the involuntarily committed." Id.
233 See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
234 Such an approach is contrary to the Court's own precedent; see the discussion of the
Trop case, supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text. See also Graham v. Conner, 490
U.S. 386 (1989) (suggesting Fourth Amendment applicability to the police brutality
example).
235 Landry, supra note 127, at 1660. For an argument that the prison conditions cases are
really due process cases and not Eighth Amendment situations, see Genty, supra note 216.
236 Harsh penalties for violations of prison rules, for example, may be sufficiently
analogous to imposed sentences to implicate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 41 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "As a legal term of art, 'punishment' has
always meant a 'fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the
law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by
him."' Id. at 38 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990)).
A similar view was expressed earlier by Judge Posner in discussing the futility of a cruel
and unusual punishment claim made by inmates who suffered injury in a bus accident
occurring while the inmates were being transported by prison officials:
[T]he plaintiffs ... get nowhere if the words "unusual" and "punishment" were given anything
like their normal meanings. The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise
or deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century;
Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language (1755) defines "punishment" as "Any
infliction or pain imposed in vengeance of a crime." If a guard decided to supplement a
prisoner's official punishment by beating him, this would be punishment, and "cruel and
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To deny Eighth Amendment remedies to persons subjected to
nonpunitive governmental cruelty is not, of course, necessarily to deny
relief for a violation of constitutional rights. Thus, in his opinion for the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Glick,2 37 Judge Friendly
found the Eighth Amendment inapplicable in a case where a jail guard
brutally beat an inmate awaiting trial. In reviewing the applicable Eighth
Amendment caselaw at the time, Friendly stated that "the thread common to
all these cases is that 'punishment' has been deliberately administered for a
penal or disciplinary purpose., 238 The Johnson case, in contrast, constituted
a "spontaneous attack" by a guard which Friendly found to be "cruel" and
hopefully "unusual" but which "[did] not fit any ordinary concept of
'punishment.' ' 239 Therefore, the inmate was denied an Eighth Amendment
remedy but Judge Friendly assumed that brutal police conduct violated a
right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause instead.
Arguably, the Supreme Court should follow a similar approach in the
prison condition cases. The issues in those cases speak more to alleged
breaches of the duty of government to care for those in its custody than to
instances of cruel punishment. As such, the cases are more accurately
conceptualized as due process, rather than Eighth Amendment, cases.24 °
Outside the Eighth Amendment context, the Court has decided a
variety of cases hinging on whether a given governmental response to
undesirable conduct constituted "punishment." I have traced the early
development elsewhere. 241 The Court appears recently to have settled on a
general approach in determining whether a contested sanction constitutes
punishment.242 If the legislature designates the sanction as punitive, the
unusual" because the Supreme Court has interpreted the term to forbid unauthorized and
disproportionate, as well as barbarous, punishments.... But if the guard accidentally stepped on
the prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything remotely like the
accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 651-52 (7th Cir. 1985).
237 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
238 Id. at 1032.
239 Id.; see also supra note 236.
240 See Genty, supra note 216.
241 See Gardner, supra note 125, at 798-819.
242 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) ("The framework for our inquiry [into
determining the presence of 'punishment'] is well established"). The approach described
immediately infra in the text has been followed explicitly by the Court in the following
cases: Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (holding mandatory registration by sex offenders not to be
punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997) (holding commitment of sex offender at completion of prison sentence not to be
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses); Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (holding monetary penalties and occupational debarment
not to be punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Ursery,
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matter is essentially settled.243 If, however, the legislative intent indicates
that the sanction is a nonpunitive civil sanction, the Court will defer to the
legislature unless a party challenging the sanction shows by the "clearest
proof' that the sanction is "so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate [the
government's] intention to deem it civil. '244 In addressing the question of
punitive purpose or effect, the Court routinely appeals to the "useful
guideposts ' '245 established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,246 a case that
articulated "the tests traditionally applied to determine whether a [sanction]
is penal or regulatory in character., 247 These "tests" include the following:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.24A
Some aspects of these "tests" obviously correspond to Hart's "standard
249case" of punishment. Punishment involves "an affirmative disability or
restraint" applied to "behavior" routinely sought to be "deterred." Thus, in
contexts outside the prison conditions cases, the Court appears to have
embraced the standard view that punishment by definition imposes
unpleasantness upon a person as a response to his commission of an
undesirable act.
C. ROBINSON AND "MALISHMENT"
In Robinson, the California statute imposed a jail sentence of ninety
days to one year for the "misdemeanors" of using or being addicted to
heroin.250  As a response to "misdemeanors," the sentence imposed a
painful consequence (time in jail) and was fixed in its duration, and thus
518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding forfeiture of property not punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (holding commitment as a
"sexually dangerous person" not punishment for purposes of the privilege against self-
incrimination); Bell v. Wolfish, 442 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (holding that pretrial detention
was not punishment "prior to an adjudication of guilt").
243 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
244 Id.; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
245 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
246 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
247 Id. at 168.
248 Id. at 168-69 (emphasis added).
249 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 17-18.
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appears to have been a punitive sanction.25 1 As applied to the offense of
drug use, the statute clearly imposed punishment. Is the same thing true,
however, with its application to the status of being addicted to narcotics?
Given the fact that the commission of an offense is a central defining
characteristic of punishment 252 it is logically impossible to "punish" a status
condition. However, no member of the Robinson Court questioned the
possibility that the Eighth Amendment might be inapplicable because the
sanction at issue did not constitute punishment.
If the sanction at issue in Robinson was not "punishment," what was
it? In fact, it constituted no recognizable or defensible legal sanction.
The State of California attempted the impossible: to impose
punishment in a situation where it logically, by definition, could not be
imposed. The circumstances are similar to a hypothetical situation posited
by John Rawls where he imagines an institutionalized attempt to punish
innocent persons (scapegoats) whenever doing so would be in the best
interests of society.253 Because actual or perceived violation of the law by
an offender is required as part of the definition of punishment Rawls
embraces, 254 the attempt to "punish" the scapegoat is impossible.
Therefore, the institutionalized response to the scapegoat is not
"punishment" but something different which Rawls calls "telishment. ' '255
Through the device of a thought experiment about the implications of
institutionalizing telishment, Rawls attempts to defend utilitarianism against
the retributive criticism that it permits punishing/telishing scapegoats.
The logical problem with applying punishment in Robinson is even
more fundamental than in Rawls's telishment situation. Rawls imagines the
institution of telishment in order to discuss the scapegoat criticism of
utilitarianism without being stopped from such discussion by the definition
of punishment.2 56 As noted above, Hart provides a "sub-standard case" of
"punishment" so as to avoid the definitional stop,257 but even in the sub-
standard case, a breach of a rule is still an essential factor for punishment.258
Because status conditions do not constitute "breaching a rule," "punishing"
them is simply not possible, even in Hart's sub-standard cases of
punishment. Whatever the California sanction for narcotics addiction was,
it was not "punishment."
251 See supra note 250; see also supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
253 Rawls, supra note 191, at 62.
254 Id. at 61; see supra text accompanying note 190 (discussing Hart's condition (iii)).
255 Rawls, supra note 191, at 62.
256 Id. at 61-62.
257 See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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The sanction in Robinson did not constitute any acceptable legal
sanction. It was not coerced therapy; the sanction lacked the indeterminacy
of therapeutic dispositions259 and made no pretense at treatment. 260 It was
not a quarantine; the disease of drug addiction is not contagious. The
sanction was not a form of preventive detention; its determinate nature
belied such 261 and the statute made no mention of confinement of addicts
because they are dangerous.
I suggest that the best way to understand the Robinson sanction is as a
statutory attempt to punish262 in circumstances where it was logically
impossible to actually do so. The sanction is thus one not recognized in the
law. Similar to the institution of "telishment," I propose that California's
response to drug addiction in Robinson be understood in terms of a new
concept, which I will call "malishment," defined as the institutionalized
attempt by a governmental entity to punish a status condition. Because
Robinson involved "malishment" and not "punishment, ' 263 the Eighth
Amendment was not applicable in that case.
259 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1986) (fact that persons institutionalized
as "sexually dangerous" persons were released as soon as they were rehabilitated evidenced
a therapeutic rather than a punitive commitment); In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 402 N.Y.S.
2d 528 (1978) (juvenile court dispositions with six month or twelve month mandatory
minimum sentences indicated punishment and belied therapeutic dispositions); supra note
204 and accompanying text; see also Gardner, supra note 125, at 818. But see In re De La
0, 378 P.2d 793 (1963) (recognizing commitments of drug addicts for periods of six months
minimum to five years maximum as therapeutic, not punishment).
260 In a dissenting opinion in Robinson, Justice Clark argued that the sanction in
Robinson constituted a permissible therapeutic response to drug use. Justice Clark offered
no explanation of how the incarceration of "incipient addicts" would cure them apart from
observing that when paroled, such persons would be subjected to "frequent tests" to detect
renewed use which may in turn lead to the "civil commitment" of the addict. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 681 (Clark, J., dissenting). None of this justifies the conclusion
that being jailed for being an addict could in any meaningful sense be characterized as a
dispensation of therapy. No other member of the court joined Justice Clark in seeing the jail
sentence as therapeutic.
261 See Gardner, supra 125, at 818; supra note 204 and accompanying text. In preventive
detention situations "the length of confinement depends, or at least should depend, on the
individual rather than the state or a statutory provision." Slobogin, supra note 60, at 52.
262 While certainly not analyzing the Robinson problem in such terms, Justice Douglas
might have instinctively perceived the case to involve an attempt to punish rather than as a
case of actual punishment. Douglas specifically says that the California statute is a "direct
attempt to punish" addicts who cannot be committed civilly. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 677
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
263 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (discussed supra notes 229-32 and
accompanying text) might also appear to be a malishment case, but the guard's action in that
case was not an "institutionalized attempt by a governmental entity to punish a status
condition," but rather was a manifestation of pure brutality and cruelty visited upon a person
occupying the status of inmate. See supra note 228.
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D. "PUNISHMENT" OR "MALISHMENT": WHY DOES IT MATTER?
The Supreme Court's failure to carefully attend to the concept of
punishment in Robinson, and to a lesser degree in the prison cases, 264 is
unfortunate for a variety of reasons. While thorough consideration of each
of these reasons cannot be explored here, brief discussion should suffice for
present purposes.
First of all, for the Robinson Court to extend a constitutional provision
to a new and controversial context 265 by totally disregarding a key concept
of the provision's text is sloppy judicial craftsmanship and, given the lack
of precedent and the absence of any analysis, 266 a blatant exercise of judicial
activism. Clearly, from its inception to the present, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is about "punishment,, 267 the noun modified by the
adjectives "cruel and unusual." Failure to attend to constitutional text is a
fundamental flaw in constitutional interpretation. As Professor Richard
Fallon states, "[T]he text must be held dispositive" for "[a]n 'interpretation'
that is unsupportable by the text, as measured by conventional norms, is not
constitutional interpretation as our tradition knows it."'268 In the context of
264 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
267 See generally Granucci, supra note 10. See also Landry, supra note 127, at 1609,
1624-25 (providing dictionary definitions of "punishment" at time of adoption of Bill of
Rights, all of which include inflictions related to past wrongdoing); supra notes 208-10, 236
and accompanying text.
For an argument that, at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the word
"punishment" might have meant pretrial torture aimed at inducing confessions in addition to
the penalty administered as a consequence of being convicted for a criminal offense, see
Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth
Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 661, 667-81 (2007). But see Granucci, supra note 10, at 849
n.46 (suggesting that early English concerns regarding the evils of torture might have been
directed not at pretrial torture but to torturous punishments inflicted upon conviction). In
any event, there is no reason to believe that the founders intended the Eighth Amendment to
address pretrial torture given their inclusion of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
coerced self-incrimination. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 260 n.2 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (discussing the exchange between Patrick Henry and George Mason, who
pointed out that torture to induce confessions was prohibited by the right against self-
incrimination).
268 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1244 (1987) (identifying five kinds of constitutional
arguments that have a legitimate place in constitutional interpretation, i.e., arguments from
the constitutional text, the Framers' intent, constitutional theory, judicial precedent, and
moral or policy values). While he prioritizes the arguments in the order given above, he
argues that in most cases the arguments can each be reconciled with one another, thus
rendering prioritizing them unnecessary.
Applying Professor Fallon's model to the facts of Robinson supports this author's
conclusion that the Court improperly applied the Eighth Amendment. The textual argument
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the malishment sanction in Robinson,269 the argument from the text
excludes Eighth Amendment applicability to that case. Referring again to
Professor Fallon, while the text of the Eighth Amendment "may not tell us
precisely what 'cruel and unusual punishments' are, the language does
require that the amendment's prohibition apply only to actions that can
plausibly be described as 'punishments.'
270
Moreover, there is no basis for believing that the word "punishment"
as articulated in the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in any other
manner than ordinary language terms. Rather than a term of art broad
enough to cover malishment, "punishment" should be understood in its
ordinary language usage as unpleasantness visited upon an offender for his
offense.271  Expanding usage of ordinary language to legal terms of art
should be done with caution.27 2 In Professor Fallon's words, "For the
Constitution to remain a constraint on judicial decision-makers, suggested
has been made. The case did not involve "punishment" (see supra notes 182-262 and
accompanying text), therefore the Amendment was inapplicable. Such a conclusion is also
consistent with the Framers' intent argument. While little evidence of their intent exists,
Furman, 408 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring), there is no reason to believe that they
had any other definition of punishment in mind than that understood in the dictionaries of the
day. See supra note 236. As for arguments from constitutional theory, the application to
Eighth Amendment applicability is less clear. Some constitutional theories, originalism for
example, would arguably deny extending the Eighth Amendment to the Robinson facts,
while open system theories may support the opposite conclusion. See Fallon, supra, at
1211-27 for discussion of originalist and open system theories. As for precedent prior to
Robinson, there was none that required extending the Eighth Amendment to the case. See
supra notes 9-20, 170-76 and accompanying text.
The final type of argument identified by Professor Fallon, moral and policy argument,
provides some support for applying the Eighth Amendment in Robinson. To the extent
anyone on the Robinson Court offered any justification for Eighth Amendment applicability,
it was Justice Douglas who argued that an Eighth Amendment remedy was necessary to
avoid the "barbarous action" of making sickness a crime. See supra text accompanying note
25.
Even if arguments from underlying constitutional value might justify Eighth Amendment
applicability in Robinson, the other four arguments clearly do not. Under Professor Fallon's
model, if there exists conflict within the five kinds of arguments, they then become
prioritized, thus rendering the Eighth Amendment inapplicable under arguments from the
text, Framers' intent, precedent, and possibly also under constitutional theory.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 250-63.
270 Fallon, supra note 268, at 1195. Professor Ely adds:
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does invite the person interpreting it to freelance to a
degree, but the freelancing is bounded. The subject is punishments, not the entire range of
government action, and even in that limited area the delegation to the interpreter is not entirely
unguided: only those punishments that are in some way serious ("cruel") and susceptible to
sporadic imposition ("unusual") are to be disallowed.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 (1980).
271 See supra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
272 See Fallon, supra note 268, at 1253.
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interpretations that depart too far from the ordinary moral and political
vocabulary of the society have to be disfavored.,
27 3
As will be shown in Part V, the Robinson Court reached the right
result but did so under the wrong constitutional text.274 The temptation to
find a remedy for the obvious evil of malishing a status condition led the
Robinson Court to "play[] fast and loose with Eighth Amendment
doctrine, ' '275 thus inviting criticism that the Court hypocritically makes law
out of whole cloth while claiming to follow the Constitution,276 and in turn,
bringing disrespect to the Court. Surely, we should expect the Supreme
Court to at least go through the motions of attending to the text of the
Constitution.
In addition to problems of shabby craftsmanship, Robinson set into
place the slippery slope regenerated by Jones27 7 but with implications far
beyond.278 As noted above, the full reach of Robinson may lead to the
abandonment of mens rea in light of a full-fledged acknowledgment of
psychological determinism, thus resulting in Packer's "demise of the
criminal law.,
279
Some have argued that such a demise is long overdue. For decades
critics of the criminal justice system have advocated its abolition in favor of
a preventative system based entirely on rehabilitation when possible and
incapacitation of the dangerous when necessary. 280 Recently, with the
availability of supposedly more effective tools for accurately predicting
future dangerousness, new calls are being made urging the abandonment of
281 thusthe criminal sanction, 1 and thus the criminal law,28 2 in favor of a new
273 Id.
274 As a description of the Robinson Court, the words of T.S. Eliot are strikingly
appropriate: "The last temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong
reason." T. S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1935).
275 Landry, supra note 127, at 1675.
276 Id. at 1675-76.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 80-115.
278 See supra text accompanying notes 153-66.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
280 See, e.g., KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 190-218 (1966); BARBARA
WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 32-84 (1963).
281 See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
121 (2005) (advocating discarding the "punishment model" in favor of one centering on
preventing dangerous persons from offending).
282 The punitive sanction is generally understood to be the defining characteristic of the
"criminal" system. See supra notes 123-26.
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283systematic therapeutic/incapacitative model. Forces threatening the
demise of the criminal law thus appear to be gathering momentum.
The objections to the abolition of the criminal justice system, with its
employment of punishment of offenders for their offenses, in favor of a
forward-looking preventative system are well known and, I believe,
compelling. Many influential thinkers have counseled against jettisoning
the criminal system and offered defenses of it both in terms of its usefulness
in providing public security and in its homage to human dignity.
Proponents of the security rationale argue that the criminal law, with its
actus reus and mens rea requirements, affords law-abiding persons
protection and security2 84 from governmental interference in their lives.
One need simply avoid the culpable commission of a criminal offense to be
virtually assured that the government will not interfere in the conduct of
one's life.
Such assurance is not available under the therapeutic/incapacitative
model. If incapacitation of the dangerous were the sole consideration, there
appears to be no reason why any past action would be required once the
predictive instruments indicated that an individual was sufficiently
dangerous to justify state intervention.285 Citizens would thus be at risk of
government sanction not for what they have done, a matter over which they
have considerable control, but for the kind of person the state believes them
to be, a matter over which they have little control.
Some advocates of the therapeutic/incapacitative model attempt to
soften these criticisms by requiring commission of a harmful act as a
prerequisite for intervention, but without the necessity of proving mens rea,
thus dispensing with the requirement that the act be culpably committed.286
Such a move does not solve the insecurity problem, however. As H.L.A.
Hart puts it:
In a system in which proof of mens rea was no longer a necessary condition for
conviction the occasions for official interferences in our lives would be vastly
increased. If the doctrine of mens rea were abolished, every blow, even if it was
apparent that it was accidental or merely careless, and therefore not under the present
283 Professor Slobogin suggests that his preventive model might require the commission
of a harmful act that is "nonaccidental and unjustified." Apparently ignoring the
phenomenon of "accident prone" people, Slobogin says that "[a]s an empirical matter, a
person who has not done (or tried) anything harmful or whose harmful act is inadvertent or
justifiable is unlikely to be considered a risk in any event." Slobogin, supra note 281, at
135.
284 Such security is in addition to any enjoyed by the criminal system's deterrence of
criminal offenses.
285 Robinson, supra note 201, at 1439.
286 Such is the position, for example, of Barbara Wootton. See WOOTTON, supra note
280, at 52-53, 66, 75-79; see also supra note 283.
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law a criminal assault, would in principle be a matter for investigation under the new
scheme. This is so because the possibilities of a curable condition would have to be
investigated and if possible treated.
2 8 7
Other theorists defend the institution of punishment as administered
through the criminal justice system as itself a basic human right. For
example, in his paper Persons and Punishment,
288 Herbert Morris argues 289
that guilty persons have a moral right to be punished for their criminal
offenses. Under Professor Morris's theory, the moral right to be punished
derives from a more fundamental natural right, inalienable and absolute: the
right to be treated as a person. Persons are entitled to have their choices
respected; therefore, when one chooses responsibly to engage in morally
reprehensible conduct prohibited by a just system of criminal law, one
chooses also the consequences of his offense: punishment. That choice is to
be respected.
On the other hand, the therapeutic/incapacitative model regards
deviant conduct as merely symptomatic of a pathological dangerous
condition rather than conduct of responsible human agents whose choices
are worthy of respect. Preventive interventions are directed towards
treating present abnormality or confining the dangerous, and the preventive
model makes no attempt to proportion the degree or kind of response to past
2.7 H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 74 YALE L.J. 1325, 1330 (1965). Hart adds: "This
expansion of police powers would bring with it great uncertainty for the individual citizen
and, though official interference with his life would be more frequent, he will be less able to
predict their incidence if any accidental breach of the criminal law may be an occasion for
them." Id.; see also Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility 158, 181-85, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 189. Sanford Kadish, in The Decline of
Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 288 (1968) adds:
But it is crucial to keep in mind as well the positive side of the criminal law. It not only provides
for the punishment of the guilty, it also protects the rest of us against official interference in the
conduct of our lives and does so primarily through the much maligned concept of innocence.
Where a person has behaved as well as a human being can behave, the requirement of mens
rea... protects him. To abandon mens rea and to substitute a Wootton code-in which... the
occurrence of the harm as a purely factual consequence of a person's physical movements
suffices for conviction-removes this essential safeguard. Even the best of us may be swept into
the net, for the test of our eligibility for sanctions is not our responsible acts and the
consequences for which we may fairly be held responsible, but sheer accident; and accident, by
definition, may befall us all. Nor is it any comfort that we will no longer be exposed to
condemnation and punishment as such. Whatever it is called we will be exposed to coercive
intervention by the state in our daily lives regardless of our most dutiful efforts to comply with
what is required of us. Even if the proposal would more effectively deal with the threat of
crime.., it would do so by substituting what most of us would consider a greater threat to our
security and liberty.
288 Morris, supra note 200.
289 The description of Morris's work in the text is drawn from my previous work. See
Martin R. Gardner, The Right to be Punished-A Suggested Constitutional Theory, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 838, 839-46 (1981).
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conduct. This is in direct contrast to the institution of punishment which
necessarily attends to past offenses by limiting the amount of suffering one
must endure to that deemed proper to pay the "debt" owed society through
commission of the offense. Moreover, when preventive interventions are
therapeutically grounded, they are blatantly paternalistic and highly
coercive insofar as the therapist is assumed to know, and thus permitted to
utilize, those treatments that will be beneficial to the patient even though
the patient may object to their use. On the other hand, rather than seeking
to benefit the offender, the primary thrust of punishment is to exact from
the offender his debt to society, payment of which removes his guilt. Given
the alternatives of an indefinite period of preventive detention or a specified
period of punishment, the right to be punished becomes an important right
that offenders may wish to claim. 290 Unlike therapy, punishment offers the
offender opportunities to plan his future accordingly and to pay the price for
his action within a system which treats him as a responsible moral actor.291
Regardless of whether or not one is convinced by arguments for
retaining the criminal justice system, if the system is to be abandoned such
decision should not come from court decisions but through the legislative
process. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his Powell opinion and as the
above defenses of the criminal system and its utilization of punishment
make clear, administering criminal justice entails a host of "religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man., 292  Such
issues involve value judgments best suited to legislative bodies.293
290 See, e.g., the discussion of Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in Gardner, supra
note 289, at 854-57 (inmate has a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest in remaining in
prison (being punished) that could not be infringed by being transferred to a mental
institution without procedural protections).
291 Others have advanced views similar to Morris's. See, e.g., C.S. Lewis, The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDCATAE 224, 228 (1953).
Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most
oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral
busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be
satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so
with the approval of their own conscience. They may be more likely to go to Heaven yet at the
same time likelier to make a Hell of earth. Their very kindness stings with intolerable insult. To
be "cured" against one's will and cured of states which we may not regard as disease is to be put
on a level with those who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be
classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals. But to be punished, however severely,
because we have deserved it, because we "ought to have known better," is to be treated as a
human person made in God's image.
See also Fingarette, supra note 32, at 444 (observing that "lawful and proper threat of
[punishment] may be... a morally humane approach" that regards the addict as an
"autonomous person, responsible for guiding his life, and subject to law").
292 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968); see supra text accompanying note 46.
This view suggests that criminal law is a "process" rather than a "substantive corpusjuris":
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Finally, if judges are obligated to "carry things to their logical
conclusion 2 94 and if the logical conclusion of Robinson is a process that
leads to Powell and then to the Jones approach and beyond, ultimately
ending in the total demise of the criminal law, Robinson must be revisited
by the Supreme Court. Even if that process can somehow be stopped short
of its logical conclusion, sufficient doctrinal damage has already been done
to require repair. How that repair should occur is the subject of the next
section.
V. ROBINSON AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The position of the Jones court on the issue of the scope of the
Robinson decision is unique among the federal courts of appeal. Clearly, it
is time for the Supreme Court to clarify matters. The recommendation here
is that the Court do so by reaffirming the result in Robinson under the Due
Process Clause, thereby rejecting the Jones analysis and narrowing
Robinson's expanse to actus reus issues.
[C]riminal law collapses virtually by definition into politics, for it is through politics and the
processes of representative democracy that society expresses its developing norms and negotiates
the accommodation of new imperatives within existing moral and philosophical commitments.
If criminal law truly is and shall remain a community practice, and a flexible and dynamic one at
that, then the competent forum for that practice must be the legislature, not a constitutional court
whose judgments are manifestly less representative, ostensibly final and authoritative, and, thus,
difficult to undo.
Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 1269,1302 (1998).
293 See supra note 292; see also, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (stating
that it is not the mission of the Court to decide wise social policy or matters "out of harmony
with a particular school of thought") (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc. 348 U.S. 483,
488 (1955)); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (holding that when an issue involves
sensitive policy choices the "appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the
legislature"); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("[C]ourts do not substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies."); Williamson, 348 U.S.
at 488 (noting that the Court does not strike down state laws because they may be "unwise"
or "improvident"); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, Inc., 313 U.S.
236, 246 (1941) (finding concerns about the "wisdom, need, or appropriateness" of
legislation involves choices which should be left to the states and to Congress).
Ironically, if the Robinson case has anything to say about the substantive criminal law, it
might cut in the opposite direction than that described in this Article. Rather than leading to
the demise of the criminal law, Robinson can be read to embody the right to be punished as
described supra at notes 289-92 and accompanying text. See Gardner, supra note 289, at
846-52. On this view it would be unconstitutional to abolish the criminal justice system in
lieu of one founded on therapeutic and incapacitive principles.
294 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A. THE PROBLEM IN ROBINSON: MALISHMENT AS IRRATIONAL STATE
ACTION
As shown above, Robinson is not a case about punishment. Rather, the
malishment imposed by the California statute constituted totally senseless
governmental action. Putting someone in jail for ninety days to one year
for being sick is simply absurd.295
The only possible rationale for malishing drug addicts might be to
deter them from becoming addicts in the first place, assuming, of course,
that drug addiction is a product of voluntary use of illegal narcotics prior to
becoming addicted.296 While most addicts no doubt do become addicted in
such circumstances, for those whose addiction results from medically
prescribed narcotics or for those born with narcotic addictions 297 any
proffered justification of their malishment as a basis for deterring their
addiction is clearly irrational. Any appeal to deterrence similarly fails even
in cases of addiction resulting from voluntary use of illegal narcotics. The
very same statute that malished addiction also punished use of the narcotics
causing addiction. 98 Any possible deterrence rationale was thus exhausted
through the punishment of narcotic use. In short, the malishment sanction
at issue in Robinson simply makes no sense.
295 The absurdity is famously illustrated by Samuel Butler:
Prisoner at the bar, you have been accused of the great crime of labouring under pulmonary
consumption, and after an impartial trial before a jury of your countrymen, you have been found
guilty.... You were convicted of aggravated bronchitis last year; and I find that though you are
now only twenty-three years old, you have been imprisoned on no less than fourteen occasions
for illnesses of a more or less hateful character ....
You may say that it is not your fault. The answer is ready enough at hand, and it amounts to
this-that if you had been bom of healthy and well-to-do parents, and been well taken care of
when you were a child, you would never have offended against the laws of your country, nor
found yourself in your present disgraceful position. If you tell me that you had no hand in your
parentage and education, and that it is therefore unjust to lay these things to your charge, I
answer that whether your being in a consumption is your fault or no, it is a fault in you, and it is
my duty to see that against such faults as this the commonwealth shall be protected. You may
say that it is your misfortune to be criminal; I answer that it is your crime to be unfortunate.
SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON 120, 123 (Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1923) (1872). See supra text
accompanying notes 259-62 for discussion eliminating any recognized sanction as present in
Robinson.
296 The Robinson Court recognized the possibility that addiction may innocently or
involuntarily result from prescribed drugs or from the moment of birth. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.9 (1962).
297 Id. The California statute in Robinson drew no distinction between innocently and
culpably derived addiction.
298 See supra note 17.
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Justice Harlan realized as much, finding it an arbitrary exercise of state
power to apply the statutory jail term to addicts. 299 No legitimate state
interest supported the statute. Thus the unconstitutionality of the statute in
Robinson was a result of arbitrary law-making, not of cruel punishment.
B. ARBITRARINESS AND DUE PROCESS
As a "bulwark[] ... against arbitrary legislation, 3 °0 the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 31 is the proper remedy for resolving
the issue in Robinson. The jail sentence obviously entailed a restriction of
constitutionally protected "liberty" 302  and malishment constituted a
"substantial arbitrary imposition[]" and a "purposeless restraint[]" clearly
contrary to due process.30 3
While application of substantive due process is, of course,
controversial,30 4 the constitutional principle offended in Robinson is
299 Although Harlan offers virtually no analysis or explanation of his position, the
arbitrariness he identifies appears to be different from that inherent in the employment of
malishment as discussed in this article. Harlan sees arbitrary state action in California's
imposition of sanctions "for a bare desire to commit a criminal act" (addicts desire to use
narcotics). See supra text accompanying note 26. The objection here seems to be that the
statute's application to addicts dispenses with the traditional actus reus requirement and is
thus "arbitrary" or irrational on policy grounds. While such an argument is itself compelling
(see infra notes 311-19 and accompanying text), it is different from the argument presented
in this Article which is grounded on logical, not policy, considerations. It is certainly a bad
idea to dispense with actus reus, but it is also a logical impossibility to employ the punitive
sanction without a criminal act. See supra text accompanying notes 250-63. It is the illogic
of malishment, not its unwisdom, that constitutes its arbitrariness as argued in this Article.
300 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)).
301 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "[N]o State [shall] deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
302 Id.; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("[F]reedom from bodily restraint
has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923) (finding that the term
"liberty" in the Due Process Clause "denotes... freedom from bodily restraint" among other
things).
303 Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On other occasions, the Court has
invalidated criminal statutes on due process grounds. See, for example, supra note 64 for a
discussion of the Papachristou case striking down vagrancy statutes as unconstitutionally
vague. See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (holding that due process
requires some consideration of defendant's claimed unawareness of statutory duty to register
as a convicted felon as a prerequisite for conviction for failure to register); supra note 175.
304 "That 'substantive due process' is a dirty phrase is well recognized by lawyers and
law students." Herbert L. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for A
New Look at "Substantive Due Process, " 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490 (1971) (listing objections
to use of substantive due process); see also LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 141-51 (noting
reluctance of Court to invalidate statutes in situations necessitating passing judgment on "the
wisdom, need and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs or social
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narrow. 30 5  The employment of malishment would have been perfectly
constitutional had there been any rational basis for its employment,
however wrongheaded some may think such employment to be.306 Finding
that the malishment in Robinson is irrational and arbitrary involves little
judicial involvement in policy matters.30 7  This Article's suggested
rethinking of Robinson as a due process case involves an essentially value-
neutral analysis of California's attempt to apply the punitive sanction where
it was logically impossible to do so, thus resulting in indefensible and
obviously irrational state action.
A finding that malishment is inherently unconstitutional creates no
danger of slippery slope problems in future cases. The factual context of
Robinson is so unusual that similar cases are simply not likely to arise.308
Thus by invalidating the imposition of the jail sentence in Robinson as a sui
generis instance of unconstitutional malishment, the case can be cabined
within acceptable bounds, thereby avoiding the mischief created by the
Court's use of the Eighth Amendment.30 9
conditions" as well as decisions finding that a particular criminal prohibition is not related to
an injury to the public). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating on
due process grounds sodomy statutes as applied to consenting adults in private).
305 For some time a variety of commentators have urged the Court to liberally apply the
Due Process Clause to clearly define the imprecision in the elucidation of principles of
criminal responsibility. See generally Dubin, supra note 174; Broeder & Merson, supra note
3, at 203 (suggesting Robinson is really a due process case aimed at "completely
overhauling" state substantive criminal law through the principle that "criminal law cannot
be used to punish conduct which is morally blameless and/or which is relatively innocuous
in terms of the social evils sought to be prevented").
306 The "traditional inquiry" of substantive due process is whether there "is any rational
basis (however wrongheaded we may think it) for what the legislature has done." Packer,
supra note 2, at 1076. The Supreme Court has rarely invalidated legislation under this
narrow standard. For examples of this rarity, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535-36 (1925) (statute requiring attendance of students only in public schools did not
constitute the exercise of any "proper power" of the state and thus constituted "arbitrary and
unreasonable" state action); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (statute
prohibiting teaching of foreign languages to school children deemed "arbitrary and without
reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state").
307 In setting aside the criminal statute in Robinson, "the Court took no power of critical
importance away from the legislature[]." Thus "[1]egislative primacy in matters of
substantive criminal law remained the rule." Bilionis, supra note 292, at 1332.
308 The law in question in Robinson raised an "atypical risk[] of harshness when
measured against the usual requirements for criminal liability[:]" the "risk of arrest and
conviction without any proof of an actus reus." Id. at 1330.
309 Consequently, Professor Amsterdam is simply wrong when he says that "[ffor
practical purposes, it probably matters little whether Robinson is conceived as the Eighth
Amendment case it calls itself or the substantive due process case it appears to be."
Amsterdam, supra note 64, at 234. Similarly wrong is the view that "to say that a conviction
is unfair because cruel and unusual is not very different from saying that it is unfair because
arbitrary and unreasonable." Manes, supra note 3, at 244.
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By revisiting Robinson as a due process rather than an Eighth
Amendment case, the Court would, as it has in other cases, uphold the
result of a prior case by applying different constitutional grounds.310 The
Court should thus rethink Robinson at its earliest opportunity.
C. ROBINSON AS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FALLOUT
Finding the malishment in Robinson to be unconstitutional would
establish the narrow holding that there can be no punishment without a
criminal act, thus embracing the actus reus principle as a matter of
constitutional necessity. Apart from being logically linked to the concept of
punishment,311 the act requirement is an essential principle of criminal law
312theory for a variety of policy reasons.
For centuries the criminal law has embraced the maxims nullum
crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege (no one may be punished for an
offense unless the conduct constituting that offense has been defined by an
institution authorized to do so).313 Conduct is thus essential for criminality.
Acts, not private thoughts or perceived propensities, are required.314 Part of
the reason for requiring an act is to avoid false charges. Proving thoughts
or propensities is fraught with obvious uncertainty. As one jurist put the
matter, "[T]he thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself knows not
the thought of man .... ,,315 As Justice Black noted in Powell, there is no
way to distinguish "between desires of the day-dream variety and fixed
intentions that may pose a real threat to society.
316
310 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1986) (noting that Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), was originally decided as a Sixth Amendment case but "in
retrospect" is now perceived as a case guaranteeing the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(finding that Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), decided originally under the
"penumbra" of Bill of Rights Protections, can "rationally be understood" only as a
substantive due process case).
311 See supra text accompanying notes 187-204, 250-63.
312 No exhaustive discussion of the act requirement is possible here. For some such
discussion, see FLETCHER, supra note 55, at 421-39.
313 PACKER, supra note 196, at 72.
314 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 1 (2d ed. 1961).
315 Brian, C.J., Year Book 17 ED. IV., Pasch. fo. 1 & 2 (1478), translated in COLIN
BLACKBURN, A TREATISE ON THE EFFECT OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF PROPERTY AND POSSESSION IN GOODS, WARES, AND MERCHANDISE 191 (J.C. Graham, ed.,
Blackstone Publ'g Co., 2d ed. 1887) (1845).
316 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Even if there were
a way to read a person's mind, punishment for evil thoughts would be problematic. Most
law-abiding people occasionally hope that some harm will befall another. If such hopes
were punishable, virtually "all mankind would be criminals, and most of their lives would be
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Moreover, punishing mere thoughts would satisfy neither deterrent nor
retributive purposes. While conduct may be deterred, it is less certain that
thoughts can be.3t7  As a retributive matter, punishment is unjust unless
offenders freely choose to offend; persons must have the opportunity to
desist from wrongful activity however evil their thoughts.318 Thus, conduct
serves as a moral prerequisite for the infliction of punishment.319
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the implications of the recent reemergence
of constitutionalization of the criminal law's mens rea principle resulting
from the interpretation of Robinson v. California by the court in Jones v.
Los Angeles. I have argued that those implications pose at least a threat to
the ongoing vitality of the criminal law as traditionally understood, perhaps
even to its very existence. I have presented arguments why such a threat
should be resisted and shown that it has arisen because of misapplication of
the Eighth Amendment in Robinson resulting from the Court's failure to
carefully attend to the concept of punishment, a failure shared by the Jones
court in portions of its opinion.
In addressing these threats, I have urged the Supreme Court to utilize
due process principles in reconsidering Robinson as a case manifesting
arbitrary state action as illustrated by my characterization of the sanction at
issue as "malishment," a blatantly indefensible imposition of governmental
power. On such reconsideration, the Court should clarify Robinson as
holding, merely but far from insignificantly, that an action is a
constitutional prerequisite for infliction of the punitive sanction.
passed in trying and punishing each other." DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 70 (quoting 2
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 78 (1883)).
317 DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 70; ROBINSON, supra note 64, at 178.
318 DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 70.
319 Id. Holmes adds:
The reason for requiring an act is that an act implies a choice, and that it is felt to be impolitic
and unjust to make a man answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen otherwise. But the
choice must be made with a chance of contemplating the consequence complained of, or else it
has no bearing on responsibility for that consequence. If this were not true, a man might be held
answerable for everything which would not have happened but for his choice at some past time.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881).
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